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Articles 
Predicting Patent Litigation 
Colleen V. Chien* 
Patent lawsuits are disruptive, unpredictable, and costly.  The inability to 
anticipate patent litigation makes it practically uninsurable, exposes companies 
to costly lawsuits, and drives companies to accumulate patents in order to ward 
off litigation.  This Article confronts this systemic problem by examining the 
factors that lead a particular patent to be litigated—only around 1%–2% of pat-
ents ever are.  It relates the eventual litigation of a patent to earlier events in the 
patent’s life, including changes in ownership of the patent (assignments, 
transfers, and changes in owner size), continued investment in the patent 
(reexamination and maintenance fees), collateralization of the patent, and 
citations to the patent.  To date, these “acquired” characteristics, developed 
after a patent has issued, in contrast to the intrinsic qualities with which a patent 
is “born” have been the subject of limited academic study. 
The results are dramatic: along the dimensions studied, patents that end up 
in litigation have markedly different characteristics than patents that do not.  
Importantly for predictive purposes, these differences develop prior to the time 
of litigation, suggesting that litigation-bound patents can be identified ahead of 
time.  The results are also surprising, showing that the likelihood of litigation 
depends on not only how valuable the patent is but also on its owner and trans-
action history.  The ability to sort among many patents has many potential 
applications, including in patent risk management, patent portfolio management, 
and patent planning.  The findings presented here draw attention to a policy 
area that has been long overlooked—ensuring that the public has notice not just 
of what a patent covers but who owns it and what happens to it.  Where a thicket 
of patents covers a single product, this information can help to highlight its 
thorniest parts.  In addition, the ease with which patent owners can hide who 
they are and what they are doing with their patents raises cause for concern and 
potential reform of the patent system. 
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Introduction 
The ability to predict that an event will occur varies widely.1  Car 
accidents fall into the more predictable category.2  The likelihood of a driver 
getting into an accident depends on a number of factors.  Some of these 
 
1. For an overview of the application of statistical forecasting methods to a variety of fields, 
with more and less success, see FRANCIS X. DIEBOLD, ELEMENTS OF FORECASTING 1–3 (1998) and 
J. Scott Armstrong, Introduction to PRINCIPLES OF FORECASTING: A HANDBOOK FOR 
RESEARCHERS AND PRACTITIONERS 1, 2–3 (J. Scott Armstrong ed., 2001). 
2. Human factors, rather than roadway or vehicle conditions, are mostly to blame.  See, e.g., 
Harry Lum & Jerry A. Reagan, Interactive Highway Safety Design Model: Accident Predictive 
Module, PUB. ROADS, Winter 1995, at 14, 17 & fig.3 (finding that the majority of accidents are due 
solely to drivers and that 93% of accidents are due, at least in part, to drivers); Eleni Petridou & 
Maria Moustaki, Human Factors in the Causation of Road Traffic Crashes, 16 EUR. J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 819, 819 (2000) (“[I]n three out of five crashes, driver-related behavioral factors 
dominate the causation of a motor vehicle accident while they contribute to the occurrence of 95% 
of all accidents.”). 
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factors, like experience and driving habits,3 reflect common sense; others are 
less intuitive.4  Together they can be used to calculate the risk of a collision 
and the insurance premiums a driver must pay.5  Catastrophic earthquakes 
fall on the other side of the spectrum.  Scientists have been studying 
earthquakes for years, yet no one can predict when the next large earthquake 
is going to take place.6  “Big Ones”—earthquakes of a certain size—happen 
infrequently.7  The processes that lead to them are complex and hard to 
model.8 
It is popular to characterize patent litigation as uncertain and 
unpredictable.9  One source of this uncertainty is not knowing in advance 
 
3. See, e.g., Felix Famoye et al., On the Generalized Poisson Regression Model with an 
Application to Accident Data, 2 J. DATA SCI. 287, 291–92 (2004) (demonstrating that demographic 
factors, driving habits, and medication use affect how often elderly drivers are involved in 
automobile accidents); Petridou & Moustaki, supra note 2, at 820 tbl.1 (identifying driver 
inexperience, habitual speeding, habitual disregard of traffic regulations, drug and alcohol use, and 
nonuse of a seat belt or helmet as human factors that affect the likelihood of traffic injuries). 
4. See, e.g., Petridou & Moustaki, supra note 2, at 820 tbl.1 (citing “macho attitude,” 
“[i]nappropriate sitting while driving,” and “[b]inge eating” as contributing risk factors to the 
likelihood of traffic injuries); Eric A. Morris, Who Drives Better, Men or Women?, FREAKONOMICS 
(Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.freakonomics.com/2010/03/10/who-drives-better-men-or-women/ 
(addressing the role that gender plays and concluding that women have fewer accidents overall but 
more on a per mile basis). 
5. Cf. Car Insurance Discounts, GEICO, http://www.geico.com/information/discounts/car-
insurance-discounts/ (listing available discounts on GEICO auto insurance premiums for good 
drivers (available for drivers with “squeaky clean driving record[s]”), for good students (potentially 
available for any student who is a “smarty-pants,” that is, a full-time student with a “good academic 
record”), and for drivers who always wear seat belts and who only carry passengers that wear seat 
belts). 
6. See SUSAN HOUGH, PREDICTING THE UNPREDICTABLE: THE TUMULTUOUS SCIENCE OF 
EARTHQUAKE PREDICTION 222 (2010) (“The next Big One in California might be next year, or 
thirty years from now.  It might not happen for one hundred years.”); Hiroo Kanamori, Earthquake 
Prediction: An Overview, in 81B INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF EARTHQUAKE AND 
ENGINEERING SEISMOLOGY 1205, 1212 (William H.K. Lee et al. eds., 2003) (characterizing short-
term earthquake prediction as “very uncertain”).  Some earthquakes, including aftershocks and 
certain small “repeating” earthquakes, on the other hand, are predictable.  HOUGH, supra, at 47–48. 
7. See Earthquake Facts and Statistics, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, http://earthquake.usgs.gov/
earthquakes/eqarchives/year/eqstats.php (last modified July 22, 2011) (showing that, on average, 
sixteen earthquakes above a magnitude 7 take place each year out of the over 1.4 million 
earthquakes of magnitude 2 or greater that are estimated to occur annually). 
8. See Kanamori, supra note 6, at 1205 (explaining that an earthquake “is a long-term complex 
stress accumulation and release process”). 
9. These terms have been applied to many aspects of patent litigation, including claim 
construction, patent juries, and Federal Circuit decision making.  See, e.g., Gretchen Ann Bender, 
Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim 
Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 175 (2001) (“[T]he field of patent 
infringement litigation currently lacks the certainty and predictability necessary to efficiently 
litigate (and resolve) cases.”); Paul M. Janicke, On the Causes of Unpredictability of Federal 
Circuit Decisions in Patent Cases, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 93, 93–94 (2005) (noting other 
scholars’ criticisms of “inconsistency” and “unpredictability” in Federal Circuit patent law 
decisions); Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Donald R. Dunner, Increasing Certainty in Patent Litigation: 
The Need for Federal Circuit Approved Pattern Jury Instructions, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 431, 432–33 (2001) (arguing for the adoption of uniform jury instructions for patent cases to 
reduce unpredictability in decisions).  But see, e.g., Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)certainty at the 
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what patents will be asserted.  In certain industries, patent clearance—the 
process of surveying relevant patents to inform research and development or 
product development—is the exception rather than the rule.10  Anyone who 
holds a patent can initiate a suit, and finding the problematic patents is 
difficult.11  “Successful” searching carries a penalty—the risk of treble 
damages.12  As a result, many companies do not even try to identify the pat-
ents that their products may tread upon, remaining ignorant of the risks they 
run until it is too late.13 
While scholars have acknowledged that patents are routinely ignored,14 
they have paid scant attention to the consequences of this behavior.  Yet 
ignorance breeds insecurity—causing companies to spend millions of dollars 
in acquiring patents they hope will discourage patent lawsuits.15  Ignorance 
 
Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1188–89 (2010) (asserting that patent litigation is not 
unpredictable or panel dependent); Michael J. Mazzeo et al., Excessive or Unpredictable? An 
Empirical Analysis of Patent Infringement Awards 25–29 (June 17, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1765891 (presenting a model to explain much of 
the variance in patent-damage awards). 
10. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 70 (2008) (citing a survey of the 
Intellectual Property Owners organization, in which 65% of respondents disagreed with the 
statement, “[w]e always do a patent search before initiating any R&D or product development 
effort”). 
11. This is in part because of the difficulty of determining what a patent’s claim terms mean, a 
difficulty experienced by courts and others alike.  See Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years 
Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 239 (2005) (“In 
the cases in which one or more term was wrongly construed, the erroneous claim construction 
required the Federal Circuit to reverse or vacate the district court’s judgment in 29.7% of the 
cases.”); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction 
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 249 (2008) (reporting that 29.7% of the 
patent cases studied “had to be reversed, vacated, and/or remanded because of an erroneous claim 
construction”). 
12. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the 
amount found or assessed.”); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en 
banc) (“[T]o establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence 
that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted 
infringement of a valid patent.”). 
13. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21 [hereinafter Lemley, 
Ignoring Patents] (“[B]oth researchers and companies in component industries simply ignore 
patents. . . .  They do it at all stages of endeavor.  Companies and lawyers tell engineers not to read 
patents in starting their research, lest their knowledge of the patent disadvantage the company by 
making it a willful infringer.”). 
14. See, e.g., id. at 21–22 (arguing that researchers and companies ignore patents until and 
sometimes even after they are sued); Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: 
At the Boundary Between Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237, 2250 
(2009) (noting the “norm of ignoring patents” among scientists); John P. Walsh et al., Where 
Excludability Matters: Material Versus Intellectual Property in Academic Biomedical Research, 36 
RES. POL’Y 1184, 1189–90 (2007) (reporting that, based on surveys conducted by the authors, only 
a small percentage of researchers regularly check patents related to their research). 
15. See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem 
and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 299 (2010) [hereinafter Chien, 
Arms Race] (noting the acquisition of large numbers of patents by companies in order to build 
defensive-patent portfolios).  Two recent high-profile purchases of patent portfolios for defensive 
2011] Predicting Patent Litigation 287 
 
 
also makes patent litigation—a high-stakes endeavor that can result in a 
company losing the right to sell its products16—practically uninsurable.17  It 
makes companies complicit in the high costs of resolving disputes through 
their failure to address the relevant rights until after a product has been 
developed and changing it is costly.18  Not knowing which patents are most 
likely to be asserted or the litigation risk associated with a particular field of 
endeavor hampers decision making on how to allocate research-and-
development resources. 
For these reasons, it is worth investigating the extent to which a U.S. 
patent’s likelihood of suit can be predicted.  This Article attempts to do so.  
Previous studies have focused on how the intrinsic qualities that a patent is 
born with, such as its number of claims and references, correlate with its 
value and litigation.19  In contrast, this study considers the relationship be-
tween the likelihood that a patent will be litigated and, in addition to its 
intrinsic traits, the acquired traits it develops after it has issued but before 
litigation.  Using data first made widely available in 2010, I compare liti-
gated and unlitigated patents on a number of previously unexplored 
dimensions. 
The results are dramatic, revealing that in every way considered, patents 
that do end up in litigation differ markedly from patents that do not.  
Litigation-bound patents start out with different intrinsic traits than 
unlitigated patents and develop different acquired traits over their lifetime.  
Specifically, they are more likely to be transferred, reexamined, maintained, 
and cited, and are more likely to have owners of different sizes and have 
money borrowed against them.20  These results support the basic claim that 
just as the type of car, driver of the car, and how the car is driven impact the 
risk of accident, the identity of a patent’s owner, the characteristics of the 
 
reasons include Google’s purchases of IBM and Motorola Mobility patents.  See Amir Efrati, 
Google Buys IBM Patents, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424053111904800304576475663046346104.html (describing Google’s purchase of IBM 
patents) and Michael J. de la Merced, In the World of Wireless, It’s All About Patents, DEALBOOK 
(Aug. 15, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/in-the-world-of-wireless-its-all-about-
patents/ (describing Google’s purchase of Motorola Mobility’s patents and wireless business). 
16. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (granting district courts the power to issue injunctions to prevent 
violation of patents); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (allowing the International Trade Commission to 
exclude any article that infringes upon a valid U.S. patent).  When a core technology is involved, 
the dispute may be characterized as “bet-the-company” patent litigation. 
17. See infra notes 69–75 and accompanying text (describing the lack of viable defensive-
patent-insurance options). 
18. Cf. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, supra note 13, at 21–22 (describing how companies ignore 
patents, even when they get sued for patent infringement); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at 
the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1509 (2001) [hereinafter Lemley, Rational Ignorance] 
(noting that annually “the total cost of patent litigation is $2.1 billion, and the total cost of licensing 
outside of litigation is $525 million”). 
19. See infra subpart II(C). 
20. See infra Figure 2. 
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patent, and the way in which the patent is used influence the likelihood of its 
litigation. 
These findings have implications for patent practice and patent policy.  
They suggest that higher risk patents may in fact be identified ahead of time, 
based on a number of criteria.  From a risk-management perspective, this 
insight can be used to help companies sift through a multitude of patents, 
focus attention on the patents that are most likely to be litigated, and assess 
the risk associated with a field of endeavor.  From a policy perspective, this 
analysis reveals that patent-litigation risk is a function not only of the patent 
itself but also of its owner and what happens to the patent.  A great deal of 
scholarly and policy attention has been focused on how the patent system has 
failed to provide “notice” of the rights of patent holders.21  Most of the atten-
tion has focused on how hard it is to tell what activities fall inside or outside 
a patent’s claims,22 the so-called fuzzy-boundaries problem.23  But the 
present analysis reveals that ownership and transactional information also 
matter and are particularly important for understanding and assessing patent 
risk.  Yet much of this information, including whether or not a patent remains 
in force, has been cited, or is the subject of a reexamination request is not 
readily ascertainable.24  It may be impossible to tell the basic fact of who 
owns a patent, as patent purchases are not required to be recorded.25  These 
deficiencies add up to a kind of patent-notice failure that has not yet been 
explored,26 one that pertains to the commercial rather than technical aspects 
of a patent. 
Part I provides the empirical and policy contexts of patent clearance and 
explains why improving clearance is an important goal.  Part II presents a 
description of the events that occur over the lifetime of a patent and why they 
may be relevant to the patent owner’s decision to litigate.  Part III describes 
the methodology and datasets that form the basis of the predictive model I 
developed.  Part IV provides the results of my empirical analysis and ex-
plores the practical and policy implications of this work.  Part V concludes. 
 
21. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 71 (listing inventors’ concealment of patent 
claims, difficulty in claim interpretation, claim interpretation changes, and search costs as factors 
contributing to the “notice problem”).  See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP 
MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION (2011), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf (providing a comprehensive, policy-
oriented report on patent notice and remedies based off of primary sources including governmental 
hearings and workshops attended by business representatives, patent scholars, and patent 
practitioners). 
22. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 46 (“[I]nnovators find it increasingly 
difficult to determine whether a technology will infringe upon anyone’s patents . . . .”). 
23. Id. at 53. 
24. The difficulty of obtaining this information is described in section III(A)(3), infra. 
25. See Carlos J. Serrano, The Dynamics of the Transfer and Renewal of Patents, 41 RAND J. 
ECON. 686, 690 & n.14 (2010) (noting that patent transfers and related transactions are often 
recorded at the Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) but that such recordation is not mandatory). 
26. They are the subject of my current work in progress, tentatively entitled Commercial Patent 
Notice. 
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I. The Case for Improved Patent Clearance 
In today’s technologically advanced society, a given product may 
incorporate the technology of hundreds or thousands of patents.27  According 
to one widely cited estimate, for example, 250,000 patents cover smartphone 
technology.28  Of these patents, only a small fraction will end up in the 
courtroom.29  Determining which of many patents have a higher chance of 
being litigated has been the subject of limited academic inquiry.30  In part 
that is because the task of searching for relevant patents is daunting.  
However, it is also because scholars disagree about whether ignorance of 
risky patents really is a problem. 
Jim Bessen and Michael Meurer are among those that believe that the 
high cost of patent clearance is problematic.  They contend that the patent 
system fails to provide clear notice, including in the context of patent 
clearance.31  Four factors contribute to this failure: patents have “[f]uzzy and 
unpredictable boundaries,” patent owners can hide these boundaries, the 
scope delineated by these boundaries is overbroad, and there are a large 
number of patents.32  The lack of clear notice is unacceptably costly, they 
argue, resulting in “especially fruitless” clearance,33 increased patent 
litigation,34 and the failure of the patent system to encourage innovation.35 
 
27. See Lemley, Ignoring Patents, supra note 13, at 19–20 (noting that companies in industries 
such as telecommunications often “must aggregate hundreds or thousands of different components 
to make an integrated product”); Rick Merritt, Dealing with Mad Patent Disease, EE TIMES 
(May 4, 2009), http://www.eetimes.com/electronics-news/4082731/Dealing-with-mad-patent-
disease (reporting Intel Corporation’s estimation that about 600,000 patents relate to its business 
and that that number is growing by up to 80,000 per year). 
28. Numerous entities cite this estimate in a variety of contexts.  See, e.g., RPX Corp., 
Registration Statement (Form S-1) 59 (Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1509432/000119312511240287/ds1.htm (“Based on our research, we believe there are 
more than 250,000 active patents relevant to today’s smartphones . . . .”). 
29. See, e.g., Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 18, at 1501 (reporting that a maximum of 
about 2% of patents are litigated and that less than 0.2% of issued patents go to court). 
30. At least to this author’s knowledge, based on a search of Google Scholar, SSRN, and 
proprietary databases of “patent clearance,” “patent search,” and “patent” and “hazard” or “predict.”  
In a notable related study, Professors Bessen and Meurer have estimated the hazard that a particular 
firm (rather than patent) will be involved in a patent litigation.  See James E. Bessen & Michael J. 
Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion 18 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper 
No. 05-18, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=831685 (reporting, among other results, 
that firms with less than 500 employees are subject to an “enforcement hazard” approximately four 
times that faced by larger firms). 
31. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 53–54 (listing explanations for the poor 
performance of notice in the patent system); id. at 69–70 (examining poor notice performance in the 
specific context of patent clearance). 
32. Id. at 53–54. 
33. Id. at 71. 
34. See id. at 150–55 (presenting evidence that problems associated with notice may have 
contributed to an apparent spike in patent litigation in recent years). 
35. See id. at 147 (“[N]otice failure and the resulting inadvertent infringement are central to the 
failure of patents to provide positive innovation incentives.”). 
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The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has agreed.  In a 2011 report, it 
identified “difficulties in sifting through a multitude of patents” as a major 
challenge facing firms in the information technology (IT) sector.36  Accord-
ing to the report, many industry representatives “view[] the ‘sheer numbers’ 
of potentially applicable patents as a primary obstacle to reliable 
clearance.”37  Clearance is particularly problematic in IT because there is no 
common vocabulary, product cycles are short, and products incorporate mul-
tiple technologies.38  While a “smartphone” can be referred to as a “mobile 
device,” “personal digital assistant,” “communication apparatus,” “one-to-
many communications device,” or many other names, there are arguably 
fewer ways, for example, to describe a chemical molecule.39 
Other scholars and practitioners have a more sanguine view, however.  
The problem of clearance is really a “nonproblem,”40 they argue, because 
innovators and firms have found ways to head off patent conflicts and carry 
on with their work.41  In the biomedical field, academic researchers do not 
appear to be concerned about patent infringement.42  For example, clearance 
is viewed as “manageable” in commercial-biopharmaceutical settings.43  In 
the IT industry, clearance is not routinely performed,44 but companies often 
accumulate patents to deter patent lawsuits as part of the patent arms race.45  
 
36. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 90, 135. 
37. Id. at 90; see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 53–54 (citing the “patent flood” as 
one of the primary reasons behind ineffective notice). 
38. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 90–91 (reporting that IT-industry representatives 
stated that these factors make performing clearance searches impractical). 
39. See, e.g., id. at 92 (“[I]n biotech . . . [there’s] a very standardized vocabulary that is very 
easily searchable.” (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
40. The term nonproblem is borrowed from Rebecca Eisenberg.  See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1075–76 (2008) (compiling research to show that problems with 
patent clearance are not seriously affecting downstream product development). 
41. See id. at 1079–80 (observing, in the context of biomedical research, that “in most cases 
firms are able to work through the patent issues and find R&D projects to pursue that are not unduly 
burdened with IP rights” and noting that in upstream research, scientists typically ignore patents 
without repercussions). 
42. See Walsh et al., supra note 14, at 1189–90 (reporting that only a small percentage of 
surveyed researchers regularly check patents related to their research); see also Eisenberg, supra 
note 40, at 1063–72, 1076 (describing additional surveys reporting limited patent obstacles to 
research and acknowledging that academic researchers typically ignore patents); Strandburg, supra 
note 14, at 2250 (noting a norm of ignoring patents among scientists). 
43. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 81.  To promote a greater degree of operational 
freedom in the biosciences, the Australian website PatentLens makes available patent-searching 
tools and landscapes in several bioscience areas.  Explore Technology Landscapes, PATENT LENS, 
http://www.patentlens.net/daisy/patentlens/landscapes-tools.html. 
44. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 90 (“Hearing testimony described how, in the 
IT and telecommunications industries, it is ‘almost cost prohibitive’ to perform clearance searches, 
and explained that searches are likely to produce ‘false positives and false negatives.’”). 
45. See generally Chien, Arms Race, supra note 15. 
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Companies systematically ignore patents, notes Mark Lemley, yet they still 
manage to make and sell products.46 
They can do so, Rebecca Eisenberg has explained, by relying on 
widespread nonenforcement.47  Though many patents are likely infringed, the 
transaction and information costs associated with enforcing patents are 
high.48  Not only must the right patents be identified and then asserted, but 
there is a risk that the patent will be invalidated in litigation.  A lawsuit may 
invite a countersuit.49  The awkwardness of suing a company that is also a 
partner makes companies less likely to pull the trigger.50  Practically 
speaking, the benefits of patent litigation may be limited.  Short life cycles 
and the ability to design around patents in the IT sector contribute to what 
Henry Chesbrough characterizes as a “weak appropriability” regime in which 
it is more difficult for innovators to exclusively benefit from their 
innovations.51 
Thus, companies do not search because, in some sense, they can get 
away with not doing so.  If 98%–99% of patents are never enforced, it does 
not make sense to identify all 100% of the potentially infringed ones.  This 
rationale applies especially to smaller companies that fly under the radar.52  
 
46. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, supra note 13, at 20–21. 
47. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Costs and Unlicensed Use of Patented Inventions, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 53, 59 (2011) (describing the patent system as characterized by “pervasive 
noncompliance and nonenforcement”).  The heightened pleading standard recently confirmed by the 
Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009), has further raised barriers to 
suits.  See generally Damon C. Andrews, Note, Iqbal-ing Seagate: Plausibility Pleading of Willful 
Patent Infringement, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1955 (2010) (arguing that Iqbal’s heightened 
pleading standard, coupled with the Federal Circuit’s opinion in In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 
497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007), “raise[d] the bar for sufficiently pleading willful patent 
infringement beyond any attainable level”). 
48. See LAW PRACTICE MGMT. COMM., AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF 
THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011, at 35 (2011) (estimating the costs of litigation at nearly $2.5 million 
when damages of $1 million to $25 million are at stake). 
49. Cf. Chien, Arms Race, supra note 15, at 320 (discussing the litigation freedom enjoyed by 
patent-assertion entities that “do not have competing demands on their time and are invulnerable to 
countersuit,” which advantages them in part by enabling them to “more credibly threaten to exercise 
the right to exclude conferred by a patent”); Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 69 (identifying norms that 
prevent companies from bringing suit). 
50. However, this awkwardness does not prevent companies from suing partners.  A prominent 
example is Apple’s decision in 2011 to sue Samsung over iPhone and iPad technology, despite 
having been Samsung’s second-largest customer of memory chips and mobile processors in 2010.  
Miyoung Kim, Samsung Counter Sues Apple over iPhone, iPad, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2011), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/22/uk-samsung-apple-idUSLNE73L00520110422. 
51. HENRY CHESBROUGH, EMERGING SECONDARY MARKETS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
US AND JAPAN COMPARISONS 31 (2006) (citing David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological 
Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. 
POL’Y 285 (1986)), available at http://www.inpit.go.jp/blob/katsuyo/pdf/download/H17esm-e.pdf. 
52. Author’s conversations with patent counsel at several small companies in S.F., Cal. (May 5, 
2011). 
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The benefits of patent clearance seem small, especially compared to the 
costs.53 
Yet the characterization of a lack of clearance as a nonproblem is 
flawed for several reasons.  The first is that one of the facts it depends on—
the high cost of enforcement—has come under attack recently.  Patent-
assertion entities (PAEs, also known as patent trolls)—which I have defined 
as companies that use patents primarily to obtain license fees rather than to 
support the development or transfer of technology54—have figured out ways 
to reduce the costs of enforcement.55  When they pursue multiple targets at a 
time,56 assert the same patents over and over again,57 and use contingency-fee 
lawyers,58 they drive down the cost of litigating on a per-defendant and per-
suit basis.59  PAEs suffer from some disadvantages in litigating.60  However, 
 
53. See Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 55 (“Information costs and transaction costs may dwarf 
potential gains to users from identifying and clearing rights or to owners from identifying infringers 
and asserting rights against them.”). 
54. Chien, Arms Race, supra note 15, at 300; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 
8 n.5 (describing PAEs as “firms whose business model primarily focuses on purchasing and 
asserting patents”). 
55. See Colleen V. Chien, Turn the Tables on Patent Trolls, FORBES (Aug. 9, 2011), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2011/08/09/turn-the-tables-on-patent-trolls/ [hereinafter Chien, 
Turn the Tables] (explaining tactics that PAEs use to lower the costs of enforcement). 
56. Ronald A. Katz Technology Licensing, a well-known PAE, filed 107 suits against 1,295 
defendants over a ten-year period.  Who Is Suing for Patent Infringement?, PATENTLYO (Mar. 
14, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/03/who-is-suing-for-patent-infringement.html.  
Likewise, in 2010, GeoTag, Inc. sued 397 companies for patent infringement in the Eastern District 
of Texas.  Florian Mueller, Microsoft and Google Jointly Sue GeoTag Inc. in Order to Invalidate a 
Patent Asserted Against More than 300 Entities, FOSS PATENTS (Mar. 3, 2011), http://
fosspatents.blogspot.com/2011/03/microsoft-and-google-jointly-sue-geotag.html. 
57. See John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the 
Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (finding “most-litigated patents” to be 
disproportionately owned by nonpracticing entities). 
58. See Chien, Arms Race, supra note 15, at 311–12 (noting that the many lawsuits brought by 
the famed independent inventor Jerome Lemelson and his attorney, Gerald Hosier, popularized the 
contingency-fee model for use in patent litigation). 
59. See Chien, Turn the Tables, supra note 55 (describing how patent trolls have reduced 
litigation costs and developed a profitable model of patent enforcement). 
60. PAEs are not entitled to obtain lost profits and have a harder time than practicing entities 
getting district court injunctions.  See Colleen Chien, Protecting Domestic Industries at the ITC, 28 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 4–5), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856608 (documenting a post-eBay injunction grant rate of 54% to NPEs 
(including universities, research organizations, and PAEs), as compared to a 72%–77% overall rate 
for patent plaintiffs, in the district court).  Small patent plaintiffs may have a harder time finding 
experienced patent counsel willing to represent them, including due to the pressure that large 
practicing-company clients have put on larger firms to “not represent trolls” and are likely to be less 
able to afford them.  See, e.g., Gwendolyn G. Ball & Jay P. Kesan, Transaction Costs and Trolls: 
Strategic Behavior by Individual Inventors, Small Firms and Entrepreneurs in Patent Litigation 23–
24 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Papers Series, Research Papers Series No. 08-21; Ill. Law & 
Econ. Papers Series, Research Papers Series No. LE09-005; 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1337166 (finding evidence that small patent plaintiffs generally only brought strong claims 
and inferring from this that small firms are disadvantaged by being unable to bring claims of 
“average” strength under the contingency-fee model); cf. Joby A. Hughes & Kate L. Birenbaum, 
Insuring Intellectual Property Risks: Creative Solutions on the Cutting Edge, in PROTECTING YOUR 
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because “trolls” are not focused on developing or commercializing 
technology, they have less to lose from litigation—in terms of reputation, 
disruption, business partners, or countersuit—than a practicing company.  
These traits endow PAEs with a freedom to litigate61 not shared by their 
practicing-company counterparts.62  As the information- and transaction-cost 
barriers associated with litigation fall away, so too does the protective shelter 
that these costs have historically provided to infringers.63 
Another reason it makes sense to try to improve the ability of companies 
to forecast patent risks is that while ignorance may be rational,64 it is not 
optimal.  When firms are forced to operate without knowledge of the patents 
that “read on” their products, both sides lose.  Firms are deprived of the 
 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS 203, 218–20 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 1999) (discussing how 
the litigation chances of certain small patent holders are negatively affected by their shallower 
pockets and less experienced counsel). 
61. Elsewhere, I have used the term freedom to litigate to describe one of the primary contrasts 
between participants in the patent arms race, who have the general objective of securing the 
freedom to operate, and participants in the patent marketplace, where companies have exploited 
their freedom to litigate.  See Chien, Arms Race, supra note 15, at 320 (contrasting research-and-
development firms that acquire patents defensively in order to preserve their freedom to operate 
with PAEs that exploit their freedom to use their patents offensively in litigation). 
62. Practicing companies do not enjoy the freedom to litigate when they assert their patents 
directly.  However, they have found other ways to capture the benefits of the PAE business model.  
Operating companies Hewlett-Packard and Philips, for example, have formed ventures to enforce 
their patents separate from the parent companies.  See Chien, Arms Race, supra note 15, at 324–25 
(describing Sisvel, which licenses the patents of Philips and other companies, and related efforts).  
In addition, a company may support, through funds or patents, assertions by nonpracticing third 
parties for the benefit of the company, often unbeknownst to the target.  Tom Ewing has called this 
practice “privateering.”  See generally Tom Ewing, Introducing the Patent Privateers, INTELL. 
ASSET MGMT. MAG., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 31. 
63. See Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 53 (“The costs of the patent system provide shelter for 
infringing behavior that might otherwise lead to either licensing or liability, perhaps mitigating 
excesses in the patent system while retaining strong rights that motivated owners may enforce.”). 
64. Ignorance may also be a misnomer for the response of the IT industry to patents.  While 
they may be ignoring individual patents, manufacturers have paid millions of dollars to each other 
and to patent aggregators like Intellectual Ventures and RPX in order to secure the rights to large 
numbers of patents.  See Nathan Myhrvold, Funding Eureka!, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2010, at 40, 
48–49 (stating that Intellectual Ventures has a portfolio of over 30,000 patents and that the company 
has earned more than $1 billion from licensing patent bundles); Tom Taulli, RPX’s Plan: Make a 
Fortune by Fixing the Patent Mess, DAILYFINANCE (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.dailyfinance.com/
2011/01/25/rpx-fixing-the-patent-mess/ (describing RPX’s growth as a patent aggregator as 
“torrid,” stating that the company had added forty-seven additional clients at the end of 2010 over 
the five it added in 2008 and noting that these clients included Google, Samsung Electronics, 
Verizon, and Panasonic).  In addition, rather than ignoring the patent system, the IT industry has 
paid careful attention to it and has demanded refinements to the patent system from Congress, the 
courts, and the Executive Branch.  See Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ 
Friends Can Teach Us About the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 397 (2011) (reporting that 
48% of patent amicus briefs filed by individuals or individual entities are filed by IT and financial 
companies); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, app. C at 280–91 (listing representatives 
from a number of sectors as participants in FTC hearings on the patent system); Rick Merritt, House 
Passes Patent Reform Bill, EE TIMES (June 23, 2011), http://www.eetimes.com/electronics-
news/4217213/House-passes-patent-reform-bill (reporting on lobbying by the Coalition for Patent 
Fairness, a group that includes many prominent electronics manufacturers, and its contribution to 
the America Invents Act). 
294 Texas Law Review [Vol. 90:283 
 
opportunity to use patent information to make choices about how to design 
their products or prioritize their research-and-development efforts, and patent 
holders are deprived of the opportunity to transfer and commercialize their 
technology.  When product companies “fly blind” in this way, they expose 
themselves to assertions and litigation.  As the FTC has said, “resolving these 
claims often involves expensive litigation, which diverts resources and dis-
rupts business operations.  If the firm pays royalties, costs may increase and 
consumers may be deprived of the full benefit of competition among 
technologies.”65  There are many other contexts in which the ability to sort 
through a large number of patents and determine which ones are at the great-
est risk of being asserted would be useful.  Confronted with a large number 
of patents, the ability to efficiently identify the ones that really matter can 
greatly reduce the transaction costs associated with patent search, licensing, 
and purchase.  It can also help companies manage their own portfolios, for 
example, when they are deciding which patents to maintain or abandon, 
which to try to sell, and which to donate. 
Taken together, these developments make a compelling case for 
improving the ability of firms to identify litigation-bound patents.  The 
following part discusses how data on patent disputes can be leveraged to 
identify such risks, and it contains the analyses I performed to address the 
specific problem of patent clearance. 
II. Predicting Patent Litigation 
A. The Use of Patent Data to Manage Patent Risk 
The unpredictability of patent litigation is present at a number of stages 
in the product life cycle.  When deciding what research areas to pursue, com-
panies that do not search for related patents have limited information about 
how crowded the relevant patent landscape is and about who holds the rights.  
After a product has launched, a company may receive demand letters from 
patent holders.  However, the company does not know which of these de-
mands represent a credible threat of suit.66  Even after a lawsuit has been 
filed, it is not always clear which plaintiffs intend to go to trial and which are 
focused on early-stage settlement.  Once in litigation, it is difficult to predict 
 
65. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 3. 
66. My experiences in practice and comments made to me by in-house counsel suggest this to 
be the case.  See also Lemley, Ignoring Patents, supra note 13, at 22 (“Even then, it is common in 
many industries characterized by a significant number of ‘patent trolls’ to ignore the first cease-and-
desist letter one receives from a patent owner, secure in the knowledge that patent litigation is 
expensive and uncertain and that some letter-writers will never follow up with a serious threat of 
suit.”); cf. Mallun Yen, Cisco Systems, Written Adapation of Oral Remarks Delivered at the Federal 
Trade Commission Hearings on the Evolving IP Marketplace (Dec. 5, 2008), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/dec5/docs/myen2.pdf (describing how Cisco receives 
many requests that it license or purchase patents and how some of the requesting parties sue after 
their requests are declined, even though those parties and their patents were usually previously 
unknown to Cisco). 
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how long a suit will take,67 what outcomes may be reached, and, should the 
patent be found valid and infringed, how large of a damages verdict the court 
may return.  The skew in patent value, as measured by these outcomes, 
resembles lottery odds.68 
Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that the market for patent 
insurance is “extremely small and highly inefficient.”69  Offerings are limited 
and expensive.70  Defensive policies,71 which protect against the costs from 
unwanted lawsuits,72 fail to cover many situations.  Analysis of one policy 
found International Trade Commission proceedings, counterclaims, some 
unauthorized appeals, and more than twenty other situations excluded from 
coverage.73  Coverage is generally capped based on the cost of the policy.74  
Unless enough companies are enrolled, the risk cannot be spread to reduce 
the costs of coverage, a well-known problem in the insurance industry known 
as “adverse selection.”75  In order for the market for patent insurance to 
develop, these obstacles to its growth will need to be addressed. 
 
67. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical 
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 259–
60 (2006) (reporting that a small number of cases filed in the years 1995, 1997, and 2000 were still 
active as of June 2006). 
68. See Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the 
Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 149–50 & n.39 (2008) (reviewing and agreeing with 
literature characterizing the patent system as a “lottery”). 
69. Leib Dodell & Kimberly Cauthorn, Using Insurance to Manage Patent Risks, INTELL. 
ASSET MGMT. MAG., Mar.–Apr. 2011, at 37, 37.  The patent-insurance market, however, is not 
particularly young—patent insurance has reportedly been available since at least 1995.  See Mark A. 
Hofmann, Patent Coverage Lags Well Behind Infringement Suits, BUS. INS., Jan. 2, 1995, at 3 
(stating in 1995 that the first “patent infringement liability polic[y]” was issued “less than a year 
ago”); see also Jean O. Lanjow & Josh Lerner, The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A 
Survey of the Empirical Literature 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6296, 
1997), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6296 (“There is also a nascent patent enforcement 
insurance market.”). 
70. See Dodell & Cauthorn, supra note 69, at 37 (stating that patent-related insurance is 
perceived as “hard to come by” and “too expensive”).  Annual premiums for patent insurance begin 
at about 1%–10% of the indemnity limit.  Id. at 41. 
71. Besides defensive insurance, other forms of patent insurance are available.  See Luigi 
Buzzacchi & Giuseppe Scellato, Patent Litigation Insurance and R&D Incentives, 28 INT’L REV. L. 
& ECON. 272, 274–83 (2008) (noting that offensive patent insurance policies, known as “pursuit 
policies,” have been available in the United States since 1995 and modeling a form of offensive 
patent insurance).  Insurance policies may also be written to protect against the invalidation of a 
patent or to cover IP-related representations and warranties in M&A transactions.  Dodell & 
Cauthorn, supra note 69, at 40. 
72. “Offensive” patent insurance policies, by contrast, cover the costs of bringing patent 
lawsuits.  Buzzacchi & Scellato, supra note 71, at 274 & n.8. 
73. J. Rodrigo Fuentes, Note, Patent Insurance: Towards a More Affordable, Mandatory 
Scheme?, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 267, 273–74 (2009). 
74. See Dodell & Cauthorn, supra note 69, at 41 (noting that patent-infringement policies are 
generally priced according to their limits on liability coverage). 
75. Cf. Fuentes, supra note 73, at 289 (stating that the high costs of patent insurance policies 
will not be lowered unless more companies join the “risk pool” of insured companies but that these 
companies will not join unless insurance costs are first lowered); Peter Siegelman, Adverse 
Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1223–24 (2004) 
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Besides conventional risk-management solutions, the collective 
experience of the patent community may reveal patterns that can help 
product developers and patent holders reduce unpredictability.  This experi-
ence is increasingly being collected and shared through various patent 
databases.  Lex Machina, formerly known as the Stanford IP Litigation 
Clearinghouse, collects data on various facets of patent litigation.76  This data 
can be used to determine which venues are most favorable to patent 
plaintiffs,77 when to settle and license,78 and what types of arguments have 
been successful before particular judges.79  PricewaterhouseCoopers main-
tains a damage-awards database that has been used by Michael Mazzeo and 
his colleagues to identify the determinants of damage awards and explain the 
variances between them to an exceptional degree.80  Groups like Patent 
Freedom and RPX, through their membership and intelligence-gathering 
activities, have amassed data about the litigation tactics, portfolios, and pro-
files of particular PAEs.81 
These services both demonstrate and address the need for greater 
predictability about patent litigation.  However, they focus almost 
exclusively on what happens after a patent suit has been filed or a demand 
made.  Less attention has been paid to how to leverage recently-made-
available data toward reducing uncertainty at the patent-clearance stage.  
 
(“The phrase ‘adverse selection’ . . . describe[s] the process by which insureds utilize private 
knowledge of their own riskiness when deciding to buy or forgo insurance. . . .  [I]nsurers find 
themselves charging an average rate to a population that contains only the worst risks, and end up 
losing money by virtue of having their products selected by only high-risk individuals.”); David M. 
Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance 9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 6107, 1997), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6107.pdf 
(“[A] loss from adverse selection is that there is less risk spreading than is optimal.  In the adverse 
selection equilibrium, sick people end up paying substantially more for health insurance than 
healthy people because they choose the more expensive plan and because they are mixed in with 
other sick people.”). 
76. Lex Machina generously provides this data to its academic subscribers for free.  For more 
information on the venture, see The Genesis of Lex Machina, LEX MACHINA, https://
lexmachina.com/about/genesis. 
77. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 404, 407 
tbl.3, 415 tbl.5 (2010) (using the Lex Machina database to find that patent holders had the highest 
win rate in the Northern District of Texas and to find that claims were resolved most quickly in the 
Western District of Wisconsin). 
78. LMI Reports, LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/reports/overview. 
79. Id. 
80. See Mazzeo et al., supra note 9, at 27, 37, 40 (presenting an econometric model based on 
340 cases that explains 75% of the variation in damage-award amounts and suggests that awards 
“are highly predictable” and correlated with patents’ economic values). 
81. See, e.g., Home, PATENT FREEDOM, https://www.patentfreedom.com/ (noting that Patent 
Freedom “provides information on the activities, techniques, staff, funding, and patent holdings of 
non-practicing entities”).  Avancept, which specializes in gathering market intelligence about 
Intellectual Ventures, has also amassed significant data.  See Three Intellectual Property Reports, 
AVANCEPT LLC, http://avancept.com/Publications.html (describing available reports on Intellectual 
Ventures). 
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This Article fills this gap by exploring differences between litigated and 
unlitigated patents based on a variety of characteristics. 
B. Comparing Litigated and Unlitigated Patents 
The traits of litigated patents have been the subject of extensive study.  
However, past studies have tended to focus on the “intrinsic” traits that a 
patent is born with, such as the number of claims or time spent in 
prosecution.82  In part, this is because data on the intrinsic characteristics of 
patents has been readily available.83  Scholars have paid relatively little 
attention to litigated patents’ acquired characteristics,84 which include 
whether the patent has been traded, experienced a reexamination, or been 
used as security for a loan.85 
Yet post-issuance events provide improved insight into a patent’s worth 
and likelihood of litigation.  They develop later in time than a patent’s intrin-
sic characteristics, reflecting updated information about the value of the 
patent.86  While the intrinsic characteristics of patents are largely within the 
control of the patentee,87 the acquired characteristics of patents are more 
likely to reflect the evaluation of members of the public with respect to the 
worth of the patent.  For example, while a patentee can easily change an in-
trinsic characteristic like the number of claims in a patent, it is more difficult, 
for example, to get patent examiners to cite the patent in the examination of 
subsequent patents owned by others.  At the very least, these traits can pro-
vide additional indicia of patent value and the likelihood of litigation. 
For these reasons, I considered both the intrinsic and the acquired 
characteristics of patents.  I found that litigated patents are not only 
 
82. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 436–38 (2004) 
(identifying key characteristics of valuable patents); Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON 
HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 20–26), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract_id=1792442 (evaluating the value of patents held by nonpracticing entities); see also 
Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 114, 128–30 (2010) (arguing that nonpracticing entities may serve a valuable 
function by searching for high-value patents to purchase and assert). 
83. See generally Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The NBER Patent-Citations Data File: Lessons, 
Insights, and Methodological Tools, in PATENTS, CITATIONS & INNOVATIONS 403 (Adam B. Jaffe 
& Manuel Trajtenberg eds., 2002) (presenting and describing the NBER Patent-Citations Data File). 
84. With the exception of the acquired characteristic of how many times the patent has been 
cited, which has been studied widely.  See, e.g., Allison et al., supra note 82, at 449 & n.60 
(describing the literature studying forward citations). 
85. These events are depicted in Figure 1, infra. 
86. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 
69, 109–10 (2009) (noting that when inventions are patented early in the development process, their 
inventors have not had time to explore their commercial viability and stating that “[a]s time passes, 
the true value of the [patent]—the value of commercialization—becomes clearer”).  Such post-
issuance events provide much more insight into a patent’s worth than does, for example, increasing 
the number of prior art citations through the submission of more references. 
87. Even the number of prior art citations is largely influenced by applicant-submitted prior art 
and the length of prosecution.  In addition, the patentee could submit a prior art citation to the PTO 
in the prosecution of a later-filed patent application, a process called “self-citation.” 
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prosecuted differently but are also treated differently after they issue.  The 
following subparts discuss both intrinsic and acquired characteristics and ex-
plore their relationship to litigation. 
C. Intrinsic Characteristics 
Previous studies have found that patents that end up in litigation differ 
from the start from patents that do not.  The initial characteristics of both the 
patent and the patent owner have relevance to the eventual litigation of the 
patent.  Litigated patents are prosecuted88 differently than their unlitigated 
counterparts,89 and they are more likely to be assigned to certain types of 
patentees.90 
Litigated patents have more claims,91 more prior art citations,92 and 
larger families,93 for example, than unlitigated patents.  These traits reflect a 
greater investment in the patent by the patentee, signaling a heightened 
expectation of its value.94  It costs more money and takes more time to 
pursue more claims.95  Applicant-submitted prior art is often generated dur-
ing the prosecution of a foreign counterpart case,96 which requires filing and 
translation fees.97  Having an extended family of patent applications—
 
88. “Prosecution” is the process of securing a patent from the PTO.  ROBERT P. MERGES ET 
AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 181 (5th ed. 2010).  Generally, 
prosecution includes the process beginning with the filing of a patent application and ending with 
the grant of a patent, and it involves exchanges with one or more patent examiners.  See Gene 
Quinn, An Overview of the U.S. Patent Process, IPWATCHDOG (July 31, 2011), http://
ipwatchdog.com/2011/07/31/an-overview-of-the-u-s-patent-process/ (describing steps in the patent 
prosecution process). 
89. See Allison et al., supra note 82, at 456–60 (reporting findings that litigated patents had a 
“more involved” prosecution process and spent a “significantly longer” period of time in 
prosecution compared to issued patents). 
90. See infra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
91. Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on 
Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129, 140–41 (2001). 
92. Allison et al., supra note 82, at 438; see also Katrin Cremers, Determinants of Patent 
Litigation in Germany 13 (Ctr. for European Econ. Research (ZEW), Discussion Paper No. 04-72, 
2004), available at ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp0472.pdf (“In all cases litigated patents are 
more frequently cited than those unlitigated . . . .”). 
93. See Cremers, supra note 92, at 13 (reporting that, on average, litigated patents have larger 
family sizes as compared to unlitigated patents). 
94. Cf. id. at 7 (noting that citations play a role as “an indicator for the importance of the 
patent”). 
95. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(h)–(i) (2011) (listing U.S. Patent and Trademark Office fees for filing 
more than three independent claims or more than twenty total claims). 
96. See Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter? Implications for 
the Presumption of Validity 17 (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 401, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656568 (“Frequently, though not always, [prior] art 
[references] emanate[] from search reports from the examination of related U.S. or foreign 
counterpart applications.”). 
97. According to one estimate, average costs for directly filing an application in a national 
patent office range from $2,000 to $12,000 per country.  Rajiv P. Patel & Neil F. Maloney, 
International Patent Strategy: Springboard to Going Global, FENWICK & WEST LLP (June 18, 
2007), http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/publications/ip/int_patent_strategy.pdf; see also U.S. 
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through the pursuit of additional claim scope by the filing of a 
“continuation,” “continuation in part,” or “divisional” application98—requires 
more money in filing and legal fees. 
Studies have shown that who owns the patent also impacts whether the 
patent is litigated.  Patents originally assigned to individuals and small com-
panies are more likely to be litigated.99  Patents initially owned by domestic, 
as opposed to foreign, entities are also more likely to be litigated.100 
The prosecution characteristics of patents have been used by 
academics101 and patent brokers102 to identify valuable patents.  In this study, 
I use these characteristics to identify the patents most likely to end up in 
court.  In particular, I note the number of claims each patent had, whether it 
was issued to a small-entity owner, how many foreign-counterpart applica-
tions it had, and how many members were in the patent’s family, including 
direct “ancestor” patents from which the patent claimed a priority benefit and 
“descendant” patents that claimed a benefit from the patent in question.103  
As the intrinsic characteristics of patents and the choices that these charac-
teristics reflect have been well documented in previous studies, the 
paragraphs below focus on the acquired characteristics of patents and their 
relationship to litigation. 
D. Acquired Characteristics 
After a patent issues, it can follow one of a number of routes or patent 
“pathways.”104  Although the patent system has been described as a 
“two-stage bargain” of prosecution and litigation,105 there are many 
 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-910, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: EXPERTS’ ADVICE FOR 
SMALL BUSINESSES SEEKING FOREIGN PATENTS 26–27 (2003) (describing the costs of obtaining 
foreign patents). 
98. Litigated patents are associated with higher numbers of each of these forms of filing.  See 
Allison et al., supra note 82, at 456–57 (reporting that, on average, 0.72 continuations are filed per 
litigated patent, compared with 0.24 per issued patent; 0.60 continuation-in-part applications are 
filed per litigated patent, compared with 0.18 per issued patent; and 0.25 divisionals are filed per 
litigated patent, compared with 0.11 per nonlitigated patent). 
99. Id. at 438. 
100. See Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 91, at 136 (reporting that patents owned by 
domestic entities have an aggregate litigation rate almost five times that of patents owned by foreign 
entities). 
101. A good review of these studies is provided by Allison, Lemley, and Walker.  Allison et al., 
supra note 57, at 3 n.4. 
102. See James E. Malackowski & Jonathan A. Barney, What Is Patent Quality? A Merchant 
Banc’s Perspective, LES NOUVELLES, June 2008, at 123, 129–34 (discussing factors and methods 
used by investors to value patents). 
103. See infra Table 1. 
104. See Chien, Arms Race, supra note 15, at 341–42 (describing how patents traverse 
“pathways” over their lifespans through changes in, among other things, ownership and the 
purposes for which they are used). 
105. Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 763, 772–73 (2002). 
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additional decision points in a patent’s lifetime.  The potential post-issuance 
events in a patent’s lifetime are presented in Figure 1.106 
 
Figure 1.  Post-issuance Patent Events 
Ownership Investment Financing Citation Enforcement 
Transfer Maintain Securitize Forward Citation License 
Owner Size 
Change Reexamine
107   Litigate 
 Reissue/Correct    
 
With some notable exceptions,108 post-issuance patent “transactions” 
have been the subject of limited systemic empirical study.  In part, this is be-
cause the data regarding such transactions have not been readily available.  
Previously, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) would provide this 
data upon request but charge a hefty fee.109  In 2010, the PTO, under the 
leadership of its director, David Kappos, and in partnership with Google, 
made a large amount of transactional data about patents, including grants, 
assignments, and maintenance fees, publicly available for free.110 
This newly available data,111 as well as data obtained from the PTO 
website and other sources, provided the basis for the analysis reported in this 
Article.  This data have the potential to greatly enhance our understanding of 
how patents are actually being used as opposed to how they are viewed (as 
 
106. For statistics describing the prevalence of a number of these events, see infra Figure 2. 
107. The America Invents Act creates a number of additional forms of review in the patent 
office of a patent.  See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
108. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
109. E-mail from PTO official to author (July 18, 2011, 9:05 AM) (“The Patent Assignment 
Daily XML File used to be approximately $5,000 ($5,350) for the front file, 365 files, one calendar 
year.  The Patent Assignment Retrospective XML File used to be approximately $10,000 ($10,200) 
for the backfile, 8 large files, 25+ calendar years.”). 
110. Thomas Claburn, Google Hosts Free Bulk Patent, Trademark Data, INFORMATIONWEEK 
(June 2, 2010), http://www.informationweek.com/news/storage/virtualization/225300208.  This data 
was available before, but some companies spent “hundreds of thousands of dollars” to acquire it.  
Id.; see also Jon Orwant, Free Download: 10 Terabytes of Patents and Trademarks, GOOGLE PUB. 
POL’Y BLOG (June 2, 2010, 2:40 PM), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2010/06/free-
download-10-terabytes-of-patents.html (noting that another patent-database project had previously 
spent “hundreds of thousands of dollars” on acquiring data from the PTO). 
111. To view this data as archived by Google, see USPTO Bulk Downloads: Patents, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/googlebooks/uspto-patents.html. 
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documented through surveys)112 or pursued (as documented through patent-
prosecution studies).113 
1. Changes in Patent Ownership.—Patents are initially issued to 
inventors or the organizations they work for.114  Subsequently, ownership of 
the patent can be transferred by assignment.115  Patent transfers, or 
“reassignments,” are growing: in 1980, less than 2,000 U.S. reassignments 
were reported; by 2003, this number had grown to nearly 90,000.116  The 
growth in the secondary market for patents117 is a phenomenon that has been 
widely noted, including by the FTC118 and by academics.119 
 
112. See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1063, 1088 n.115 (2008) [hereinafter Graham & Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?] 
(describing many of the seminal surveys carried out to assess large-company attitudes towards IP).  
For details of a more recent study, the Berkeley Patent Survey, see generally id. at 1091–97 and 
Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 
2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255 (2009) [hereinafter Graham et al., 
High Technology Entrepreneurs]. 
113. Dennis Crouch has authored many of these studies.  See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, The Rising 
Size and Complexity of the Patent Document (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 2008-04, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1095810 (reporting that the average 
number of words and the average number of claims in patent applications rose from 1987 to 2007); 
Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Beating the Deadline: Timing the Responses to Non-final Office 
Actions, PATENTLYO (Jun. 14, 2010, 5:26 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/06/beating-
the-deadline-timing-the-repsonses-to-non-final-office-actions.html (studying how long patent 
prosecutors wait before responding to PTO actions); Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Dropping: 
Average Number of Claims Per Patent, PATENTLYO (Jan. 7, 2010, 7:01 AM), http://
www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/01/dropping-average-number-of-claims-per-patent.html (reporting 
a more recent decline in the number of claims per issued patent). 
114. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 
2188, 2194–95 (2011) (“In most cases, a patent may be issued only to an applying inventor, or—
because an inventor’s interest in his invention is ‘assignable in law by an instrument in writing’—an 
inventor’s assignee.” (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 151–152, 261 (2006))).  The practice of inventors 
assigning their patents after issue is old; according to a historical account by Naomi Lamoreaux and 
Kenneth Sokoloff, the high volume of patent assignment contracts in 1870 indicated that trade in 
patents was well developed by that time.  Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Inventors, 
Firms, and the Market for Technology in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, in 
LEARNING BY DOING IN MARKETS, FIRMS, AND COUNTRIES 19, 25 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al. 
eds., 1999). 
115. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933) (“A patent is property 
and title to it can pass only by assignment.”). 
116. CHESBROUGH, supra note 51, at 63.  Chesbrough documents a similar rise in patent 
transfers in Japan, from less than 5,000 in 1997 to more than 35,000 in 2005.  Id. at 101. 
117. As distinguishable from the market for technology, which includes not only patent 
transfers but also licenses and the transfer of know-how.  Writing in 2001, Arora, Fosfuri, and 
Gambardella estimated that the world market for technology was about $35 to $50 billion annually.  
ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND 
CORPORATE STRATEGY 43 (2001). 
118. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 58–67 (presenting a report on the 
development of secondary patent markets). 
119. See, e.g., Chien, Arms Race, supra note 15, at 310–17 (describing the different actors 
within the patent market and noting the history of the patent market’s growth); Ashby H.B. Monk, 
The Emerging Market for Intellectual Property: Drivers, Restrainers, and Implications, 9 J. ECON. 
GEOGRAPHY 469, 470 (2009) (explaining how IP strategies and intermediaries are causing the 
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a. Changes in Patent Ownership and Patent Litigation.—The 
relationship between reassignment and litigation has not been studied in 
depth.  One reason companies purchase patents on the secondary market is 
for litigation.  Indeed, the FTC has defined a PAE as a company focused on 
“purchasing and asserting patents.”120  Transferred patents and litigated pat-
ents have more forward citations121 than nontransferred, nonlitigated 
patents.122 
Universities, defunct start-ups, and healthy companies have all 
transferred their patents to companies that have litigated them.123  For 
example, the patents of Conexant, a publicly traded company, have been liti-
gated by a three-person PAE called WiAV, LLC,124 and the patents of former 
“Baby Bell” Ameritech have been used by Intellectual Ventures to sue sev-
eral technology companies.125 
In his study of litigated patents, Michael Risch found that PAEs sourced 
their patents from healthy operating companies as well as from defunct start-
ups.126  John Allison and his colleagues reported that the “most-litigated 
patents” are more likely to be reassigned than once-litigated patents.127  
According to one estimate, large companies are the source of 7%–12% of 
 
patent market to grow); Timo Fischer & Joachim Henkel, Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology: 
An Empirical Analysis of Trolls’ Patent Acquisitions 23 (Apr. 28, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1523102 (identifying an increase over time in the number 
of patents acquired by trolls); see also CHESBROUGH, supra note 51, at 3 (noting “signs of an 
emerging secondary market for IP”). 
120. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 8 n.5 (emphasis added). 
121. See infra section II(D)(4). 
122. See Serrano, supra note 25, at 699 (“[Y]ounger, frequently cited, more original, and 
recently traded patents were more likely to be traded and renewed.”); see also Allison et al., supra 
note 57, at 6, 13 tbl.2 (reporting that the “most-litigated patents” have significantly higher numbers 
of forward citations than patents litigated only once); Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 91, at 
138 (reporting that litigated patents have higher numbers of forward citations). 
123. See Chien, Arms Race, supra note 15, at 312–15 (describing the secondary-market sellers 
of patents, including defunct start-ups, very large corporations, and universities); Risch, supra note 
82, at 26–27 (noting that studied patents that were ultimately litigated were originally held by extant 
and defunct companies, partnerships, a university, and a hospital). 
124. Chien, Arms Race, supra note 15, at 343–44. 
125. See Dennis Crouch, Intellectual Ventures Takes First Overt Legal Actions to Enforce its 
Mammoth Patent Portfolio, PATENTLYO (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/12/
intellectual-ventures-takes-first-overt-legal-actions-to-enforce-its-mammoth-patent-portfolio.html 
(describing three lawsuits brought by Intellectual Ventures against other companies and the 
assignment histories of the patents involved).  For the assignment record of one of the patents in the 
suit, see Patent Assignment Abstract of Title, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://
assignments.uspto.gov/assignments/q?db=pat&qt=pat&reel=&frame=&pat=5987610&pub=&asnr=
&asnri=&asne=&asnei=&asns=. 
126. See Risch, supra note 82, at 31 (reporting that, of ninety-one companies surveyed whose 
patents were acquired by PAEs, only nine were defunct, while seventy-eight appeared to be still in 
operation in some form); see also Colleen Chien, From Arms Race to Patent World War: The 
Promise and Perils of Defensive Patenting, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. MAG. (forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at fig.2) (on file with author) [hereinafter Chien, Promise and Perils] (indicating that 
small companies and individual inventors are the main source of patents for NPEs). 
127. Allison et al., supra note 57, at 22 tbl.6. 
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NPE patents, while small companies account for 49%–50% and independent 
inventors for 26%–28% of the total.128  For many of the studied patents, the 
transfer of the patent was a precursor to its litigation.129  Thus, it seems 
worthwhile to explore the relationship between patent transfer and patent 
litigation. 
I coded three types of variables to reflect changes in patent ownership.  
First, I counted the number of recorded assignments for each patent.130  By 
itself, this number is not particularly meaningful, as the same number of 
assignments can mean different things; having multiple assignments on a 
patent can indicate, for example, that the inventors of a patent recorded their 
assignments separately or that a patent was actually reassigned from one 
owner to another.  A single recorded assignment in a patent, on the other 
hand, may be associated with a nontransferred patent or a reassigned patent 
in which the subsequent assignment has not been recorded.  In my review, 
for example, I found a number of patents that listed one owner on their front 
page but also listed a single subsequently recorded assignment to another 
owner in the patent assignment record. 
To identify true transfers, I individually analyzed each patent’s 
assignment record and noted reassignments beyond a patent’s initial 
assignee.131  I excluded merger-and-acquisition-based transfers, name-
change-based transfers, and intracompany transfers.132  As other scholars 
have documented, however, the identification of standalone patent reassign-
ments is hampered by several limitations.133  Unless the assignment record 
identifies the purpose of the patent transfer as a merger or acquisition, it is 
hard to tell whether the assignment is part of a larger business transaction.  
This is particularly an issue among the patents I studied because of the 
merger waves of the late 1990s.134  Therefore, I developed another metric—
 
128. Chien, Promise and Perils, supra note 126 (reporting data taken from Q1 2010 through Q1 
2011). 
129. See id. at 21 (reporting that out of the 106 most-litigated patents, 44 of them were assigned 
prior to the filing of the first lawsuit). 
130. I relied on patentee self-designations used in the recordation form and searches based on 
terms developed from the review of one thousand assignment records.  I included assignments prior 
to the issuance of the patent, as is maintained in the patent record. 
131. Many cases did not fit the prototypical A assigns to B, B assigns to C pattern; the following 
include some that I classified as reassignments: assignment back to the inventor, joint inventors 
assigning to different entities at different times, single recorded assignment to an assignee other 
than the one identified on the front page of the patent, and partial subsequent transfers to different 
assignees. 
132. I identified and excluded mergers and intracompany transfers through Internet-based 
company research. 
133. See, e.g., Serrano, supra note 25, at 691 (describing as a drawback the inability to 
“distinguish the acquisition of a firm from the acquisition of a bundle of patents”). 
134. See Martin Lipton, Partner, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, The Davies Lecture: Merger 
Waves in the 19th, 20th, and 21st Centuries 6 (Sept. 14, 2006), available at http://osgoode.yorku.ca/
media2.nsf/58912001c091cdc8852569300055bbf9/1e37719232517fd0852571ef00701385/$file/mer
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whether the size of the patent’s owner changed, based on the fees paid to 
maintain the patent—to track a particular type of change in ownership expe-
rienced over a patent’s lifetime.135  When Patent 5,987,610 transferred hands 
between Ameritech Corporation and the University of Texas, for example, it 
went from being owned by a “large entity” to being owned by a “small 
entity,” according to the PTO’s definition of small entity, which includes 
nonprofits.  Conversely, when Patent 7,084,859 was sold from Timothy 
Pryor to Apple Corporation,136 it traded up into a larger-entity setting.  Both 
patents were asserted by their subsequent owners.137  These anecdotes sug-
gest that three metrics are worth investigating: assignment, transfer, and 
change in size of patent owner. 
2. Post-issuance Investment in the Patent.—Scholars have found that 
patentees spend more money and time prosecuting the patents that end up in 
litigation.138  I thus explored the extent to which continued investment in the 
patent after issuance, through the successful completion of reexamination 
proceedings and the payment of maintenance fees, also correlated with a 
higher likelihood of litigation.139 
a. Maintenance Fees.—In order to keep a patent in force, 
maintenance fees must be paid at 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5 years after the patent has 
issued.140  Small entities pay half the fees required of large entities.141  At a 
cost of $980 to $4,110 per fee,142 the cost of maintaining a large portfolio can 
 
ger%20waves_toronto_lipton.pdf (describing the wave of mergers that took place between 1993 and 
2000, including a “five-year burst” of mergers in the technology field). 
135. The coding of which is described in section III(A)(1), infra.  Not all size changes were 
associated with a detectable transfer, but many of them were. 
136. See generally Thomas Claburn, Apple’s “Kinected” Kitchen, INFORMATIONWEEK (Nov. 
30, 2010), http://www.informationweek.com/news/hardware/mac/228400171 (describing the 
assignment by Pryor to Apple).  The patent issued in 2006 and was assigned in March 2010.  Patent 
Assignment Abstract of Title, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://assignments.uspto.gov/
assignments/q?db=pat&qt=pat&reel=&frame=&pat=7084859&pub=&asnr=&asnri=&asne=&asnei
=&asns=. 
137. Patent 7,084,859 was asserted by Apple against HTC Corporation.  Complaint for Patent 
Infringement at 5, Apple Inc. v. HTC Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00611-GMS (D. Del. Jul. 11, 2011), ECF 
No. 1.  Patent 5,987,610 was asserted by Intellectual Ventures against Check Point Software 
Technologies.  Complaint for Patent Infringement at 5, Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Check Point 
Software Techs., Ltd., No. 1:10-cv-01067-UNA (D. Del. Dec. 8, 2010), ECF No. 1. 
138. See, e.g., Allison et al., supra note 82, at 438 (noting that litigated patents tend to spend 
longer periods of time in prosecution than nonlitigated patents). 
139. The completion of reissue proceedings under 35 U.S.C. § 251 also reflects continued 
investment in the patent, and I considered including reissue statistics in my study.  However, 
because the number of reissuances is so small, there were too few reissued patents in my sample to 
make any statistically significant comparisons.  See Curtis B. Hamre et al., Reissue and 
Reexamination, 29 IDEA 311, 312 (1989) (“[B]y comparison to the number of patents issued, the 
number of reissues may be relatively small . . . .”). 
140. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(e)–(g) (2011). 
141. Id. 
142. Id.  These fees are those for a large entity. 
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be substantial.  The decision to maintain a patent signals its private value to 
the patent owner.143  In addition, in order for a patent to be litigated, it must 
remain in force.  For these reasons, one would expect litigation-bound 
patents to be more readily maintained than non-litigation-bound ones. 
b. Ex Parte Reexamination.—The PTO can take another look at a 
patent after it has issued through a process called reexamination.144  A 
patentee or a member of the public can initiate the process by showing a 
“substantial new question of patentability.”145  There are two kinds of 
reexamination: “ex parte” reexamination, which closely resembles normal 
prosecution,146 and “inter partes” reexamination, in which a third party re-
quests and participates in the reexamination.147  The America Invents Act 
made several changes to the procedures available to change a patent post-
grant, creating supplemental examination and post-grant review and enacting 
changes to the inter partes reexamination procedures.148 
The litigation and the reexamination of a patent are related.  A patentee 
may initiate reexamination proceedings to hone and ultimately strengthen 
claims before enforcing the patent.149  A defendant may initiate reexamina-
tion proceedings in hopes of limiting the scope of, or invalidating what they 
believe to be, a weak patent.150  According to the PTO, 33% of patents in ex 
parte reexaminations are concurrently in litigation;151 the figure is 71% 
 
143. Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1525–26 (2005) 
(empirically analyzing patent value by looking at maintenance fees). 
144. See 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2006) (“Any person at any time may file a request for reexamination 
by the Office of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited under the provisions of 
section 301 of this title.”). 
145. Id. §§ 303, 312. 
146. Compare id. §§ 302–307 (prescribing ex parte patent-reexamination procedures), with id. 
§§ 131–134 (prescribing patent-application-examination procedures). 
147. See id. § 311–318 (prescribing inter partes reexamination procedures). 
148. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 12, 125 Stat. 284, 325–27 
(2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257) (supplemental examination); Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299–313 (2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 311–329) (post-grant review proceedings); see also Matthew C. Phillips & Kevin B. Laurence, 
Changes to Reexamination Under the America Invents Act, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Nov. 2011, at 
22, 22–23, available at http://www.stoel.com/files/Changes_to_Reexamination_under_the_
America_Invents_Act_November_2011_IP_Today.pdf (describing the changes to reexamination 
implemented by the America Invents Act (AIA)). 
149. See Tremesha S. Willis, Note, Patent Reexamination Post Litigation: It’s Time to Set the 
Rules Straight, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 597, 601–02 (2005) (“If a patent passes reexamination muster 
and maintains its validity, the patentee will have a stronger patent . . . .”). 
150. Greg H. Gardella & Emily A. Berger, United States Reexamination Procedures: Recent 
Trends, Strategies and Impact on Patent Practice, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 381, 401, 
403 (2009). 
151. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, EX PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA (2011) 
[hereinafter EX PARTE DATA], available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/EP_quarterly_report_
June_2011.pdf. 
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among patents undergoing inter partes reexamination.152  Yet reexamination 
differs in several key respects from patent litigation.  The PTO does not pre-
sume that a patent is valid like a court does.153  Claims are construed 
according to their broadest reasonable interpretation rather than to the canons 
of claim construction that apply in a courtroom.154 
At the end of the reexamination process, the patent claims may be 
amended, cancelled, or left alone.155  Forty-five percent of patents subjected 
to inter partes reexamination have been cancelled entirely,156 compared to 
only 11% of patents that have undergone ex parte reexamination.157  The 
reexamination process strengthens the patents that survive it.  As was once 
remarked to me, “A patent that survives reexamination has been through a 
fire.  What emerges, then, can be considered Teflon-coated.”158  As inter 
partes reexamination is only available for patents filed on or after 
November 29, 1999,159 in the present study I coded patents for which ex parte 
reexamination procedures were completed.160 
3. Patent Collateralization.—Companies can borrow money against 
their patents.161  Secured loans have several advantages over other types of 
loans—they are available to companies that do not have the proven track 
 
152. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA 
(2011) [hereinafter INTER PARTES DATA], available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/IP_quarterly_
report_June_2011.pdf. 
153. See Parallel Universe, REEXAMINATION CENTER, http://reexamcenter.com/2009/09/
parallel-universe/ (noting that “[i]n the district court, patent claims enjoy a presumption of validity, 
which may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence,” but that there is no such 
presumption in reexamination proceedings). 
154. See In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office Board of Appeals’s decision to give claims their “broadest reasonable 
interpretation consistent with the specification” in reexamination proceedings). 
155. See 35 U.S.C. § 307(a) (2006) (stating that at the end of a reexamination proceeding, “the 
Director will issue and publish a certificate canceling any claim . . . determined to be unpatentable, 
confirming any claim . . . determined to be patentable, and incorporating in the patent any proposed 
amended or new claim determined to be patentable”). 
156. INTER PARTES DATA, supra note 152. 
157. EX PARTE DATA, supra note 151. 
158. Paraphrased from a telephone conversation with Benjamin Singer, Attorney, Ditthavong 
Mori & Steiner, P.C. (Sept. 2011).  Even when narrowed, the claims may be more tailored to the 
patentee’s purposes. 
159. 37 C.F.R. § 1.913 (2011). 
160. As signaled by the issuance of a certificate of reexamination.  See id. § 1.570(a) (“To 
conclude an ex parte reexamination proceeding, the Director will issue and publish an ex parte 
reexamination certificate in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 307 setting forth the results of the ex parte 
reexamination proceeding and the content of the patent following the ex parte reexamination 
proceeding.”).  Such a certificate issues even if no claims survive reexamination.  See infra note 
199. 
161. See Alicia Griffin Mills, Perfecting Security Interests in IP: Avoiding the Traps, 125 
BANKING L.J. 746, 747 (2008) (explaining that because intellectual property is a “general 
intangible” within the scope of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the UCC controls the 
creation of security interests in intellectual property). 
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record traditional bank lenders prefer and, unlike equity financing, they do 
not require companies to give up ownership or control.162  However, they 
require the borrower to give the creditor a security interest in collateral in 
addition to a promise to repay the loan.  If the borrower defaults, the creditor 
can claim the collateral.  The patent may be sold off at auction to the highest 
bidder163 and end up being litigated.  While both large and small companies 
use their intellectual property to get loans,164 for many start-up companies, 
their intellectual property may be their most valuable collateralizeable 
asset.165  In obtaining a loan, a company may use its entire patent portfolio as 
collateral, or just select patents.166  Under either scenario, if most uses of 
patents as collateral ultimately result in default and liquidation, a strong 
relationship between a patent’s collateralization and its litigation would be 
expected. 
Creditors have incentives to record their security interests at the PTO, 
although the benefits of doing so, as compared to recording their interests 
through Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) filings alone, are not entirely 
clear.167  Because patents are federally created intellectual property, however, 
 
162. Traditional bank loans, by contrast, are available to companies with an established track 
record, and equity-based financing involves investors such as venture capitalists who provide 
financing in exchange for ownership and control.  See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Collateralizing 
Intellectual Property, 42 GA. L. REV. 1, 13–16 (2007) (reviewing conventional debt- and equity-
financing methods and outlining their limitations).  But see Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force in 
the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L. REV. 159, 160 (1997) (arguing that one of the primary 
rationales for extending a secured loan to a debtor is to use the threat of forced liquidation to exert 
control over the debtor’s actions). 
163. See U.C.C. § 9-610(a) (2007) (“After default, a secured party may sell, lease, license, or 
otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its present condition or following any 
commercially reasonable preparation or processing.”). 
164. Xuan-Thao Nguyen notes that secured financing involving intellectual property is 
common in certain industries, notably that of film production.  Nguyen, supra note 162, at 19.  
Lenders to the film-production industry often receive a security interest in such intellectual property 
as film copyrights as well as licenses of scripts and music.  Id. 
165. Id. at 11; cf. Graham & Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, supra note 112, at 1077–
79 (describing the role that patents play in securing loans and increasing the company’s value upon 
liquidation). 
166. Cf. CHESBROUGH, supra note 51, at 68–69 (“According to some IP lawyers, in situations 
of a patent infringement suit, we were told that it is not unusual that banks ask their clients to secure 
a loan to cover the legal costs of the trial with the group of patents that are at the core of the 
litigation.”). 
167. Article 9 of the UCC, as adopted by all states, governs the creation, perfection, and 
enforcement of security interests in personal property, which encompasses intellectual property 
under the classification of “general intangibles.”  See U.C.C. § 9-102(42) (“‘General intangible’ 
means any personal property . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d) (stating that “rights that 
arise under a license of intellectual property” are included within the category of general 
intangibles).  The Ninth Circuit has held that the UCC, rather than federal patent law, governs and 
that an additional recording at the PTO is not required to perfect a security interest in a patent.  In re 
Cybernetic Services, Inc., 252 F.3d 1039, 1057–59 (9th Cir. 2001).  However, a certificate of 
acknowledgment of the assignment’s recordation with the PTO is “prima facie evidence of the 
execution of an assignment, grant or conveyance of a patent or application for patent.”  35 U.S.C. 
§ 261 (2006).  This leads to an ambiguity as to whether a secretary-of-state UCC filing is sufficient.  
See Christina Lui, Comment, Navigating Through the Legal Minefield of State and Federal Filing 
308 Texas Law Review [Vol. 90:283 
 
the recommended practice is to record security interests in patents at both the 
secretary of state’s office according to the provisions of the UCC and at the 
PTO.168  I used the PTO records to code whether each of the studied patents 
had been used as collateral. 
4. Adjusted Forward Citations to the Patent.—Once a patent issues, it 
can be cited in the examination of a patent application, creating a forward 
citation to the patent.169  The link between forward citation and litigation has 
previously been confirmed: litigated patents are more cited than unlitigated 
patents.170  In general, the more citations a patent receives, the more relevant 
it is to the patents that come after it.  For these reasons, scholars and others 
have relied upon forward citations as a measure of the economic value of a 
patent.171  To minimize the effect of inventors citing to their own patents, as 
have other studies, the present analysis adjusts the number of forward cita-
tions by excluding citations that have at least one inventor in common with 
the cited patent.172 
III. Methodology and Approach 
To identify the patents most likely to end up in litigation, I focused on 
three questions: First, how do litigated patents differ from unlitigated 
patents?  Second, do the differences between litigated and unlitigated patents 
develop before the first litigation?  Third, how do patents litigated by differ-
ent types of plaintiffs differ from each other?  In this part, I describe the 
patents I studied, the data I used, and the approaches I used to explore the 
relationship between patent characteristics and patent litigation.  Much of the 
credit for coding the data is due to the efforts of my hard-working and tal-
ented research assistants; for ease of reference in this Article, however, I will 
describe the tasks performed in the first person. 
 
for Perfecting Security Interests in Intellectual Property, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 705, 720–22 
(2011) (“The law controlling whether it is necessary to record a lien with the USPTO to perfect a 
security interest in a patent is ambiguous.”). 
168. See Lui, supra note 167, at 728 (“[D]ual-filing is the prudent thing to do . . . .”). 
169. See Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 91, at 134 (“An inventor must cite all related 
prior U.S. patents in the patent application.”). 
170. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
171. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 965 n.50 (2007) (claiming that forward citations are one of the 
“strongest predictors” of “patent value”).  But see James E. Bessen, The Value of U.S. Patents by 
Owner and Patent Characteristics, 37 RES. POL’Y 932, 944 (2008) (arguing that such citations are 
not meaningful measures of patent quality based on a statistical analysis in which citations failed to 
explain much of the variance in patent value). 
172. I am thankful to Ted Sichelman and David Schwartz for independently suggesting this 
adjustment to me.  The difference in absolute terms is not insignificant.  The average number of 
forward citations to litigated and unlitigated patents, excluding forward citations to patents with at 
least one inventor in common with the cited patent, was thirty-three and sixteen, respectively.  
Without the exclusions, however, the average number of forward citations to litigated and 
unlitigated patents was thirty-nine and nineteen, respectively.  See infra Figure 2. 
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A. Patents and Data Studied 
To identify the patent traits that distinguish litigated patents from 
unlitigated patents, I assembled a randomly selected group of 659 litigated 
patents issued in 1990.173  When filed, each patent application is assigned by 
the PTO to at least one of over 400 technology classes.174  For each litigated 
patent, I randomly selected an additional three patents issued in the same 
year and assigned to the same first-listed technology class, creating a 
matched-pair set that included 2,636 patents.175  I used these sets, rather than 
a random sample drawn from patents generally, because the application of 
statistical analysis to rare events like patent litigation tends to distort and un-
derstate the probability that the events will occur.176 
Using patents from this single year ensured that I had captured all of the 
events that occurred over the patents’ potential terms and reduced the need to 
perform adjustments to compensate for time effects.  However, it also meant 
that impacts of more recent changes in the patent system were not fully cap-
tured by this analysis.  For example, inter partes reexamination was not 
available for the studied patents, as it is available only for patents issued after 
November 29, 1999.177  In addition, the “troll” phenomenon is a relatively 
recent one, beginning in the early 2000s,178  and many of the studied patents 
had expired prior to its development.179  This means that certain of the stud-
ied characteristics, such as reexamination and transfer, may be more 
correlated with litigation of patents currently in force than they were with the 
 
173. I identified patents litigated in 1990 using the LIT-REEXAM segment within LexisNexis’s 
Utility Patents database.  I confirmed the later litigations using two proprietary databases, DocketX 
and Lex Machina.  In accordance with other scholars, I excluded patents owned by Ronald S. Katz 
Technology Licensing LP, whose numerous litigations, if included in the samples, could 
disproportionately impact the results of this study.  See, e.g., Allison et al., supra note 57, at 20 & 
n.39 (describing the impact of Katz’s lawsuits on an empirical analysis of patent lawsuits and 
excluding the Katz patents from an entity-size analysis). 
174. MPEP § 902.01 (8th ed. Rev. 5, Aug. 2006). 
175. Based on my conversation with a former PTO examiner, the first-listed, or “primary,” 
patent classification is the most important, while the other listed classes often pertain to dependent 
or less “core” claims.  E-mail from Aashish Karkhanis, Former Exam’r, U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office, to author (Aug. 10, 2011, 9:33 AM) (on file with author). 
176. There are shortcomings to using random samples with rare-events data; thus, matched 
pairs may provide more reliable results.  See Gary King & Langche Zeng, Logistic Regression in 
Rare Events Data, 9 POL. ANALYSIS 137, 138 (2001) (explaining that “most popular statistical 
procedures, such as logistic regression, can sharply underestimate the probability of rare events” 
and that using a large, unselective study sample can produce “poorly measured[] explanatory 
variables” but asserting that better explanatory variables may be obtained through the careful, 
nonrandom selection of a more limited study sample). 
177. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
178. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 58 (reporting, in 2011, that “[p]anelists 
from IT manufacturing companies uniformly reported a dramatic increase in the number of patent 
infringement lawsuits filed against their companies compared to seven to ten years ago”). 
179. Patents issued in 1990 would need to have had their second maintenance fee paid in order 
to be in force in 2001.  See supra subsection II(D)(2)(a) (describing the schedule of maintenance 
fees).  Among the studied patents, approximately 34% of patents had lapsed by that time. 
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studied patents.  As such, the results presented here may understate the rela-
tionships that currently exist between certain patent traits and litigation. 
I checked whether differences detected in the sample in general were 
robust and observable across the patents’ general technology area.  I did so 
by identifying which PTO “technology center” each patent was associated 
with180 and aggregating these centers into one of five general technology 
areas.181  In almost all cases, perceived differences in the general population 
were also observable across technology areas, as described in the paragraphs 
that follow.  However, because my sample size was limited, and because the 
PTO’s categories do not necessarily reflect up-to-date boundaries between 
industries or technology areas,182 I leave industry and technology compari-
sons for future research. 
For the patents’ intrinsic characteristics, I used a proprietary database of 
patent data,183 access to which was generously donated for this project.  For 
their acquired traits, I used a combination of data sources, including the 
PTO’s assignment and maintenance databases.  As these databases have been 
the subject of limited study, I describe them in greater depth below. 
1. Assignment and Conveyance Data.—Owners of patents can record 
changes in ownership and related events, termed conveyances, at the PTO.184  
The PTO’s “recordation” form asks parties to specify the purpose of the 
conveyance.185  Thus, in addition to assignments, licenses, mergers, security 
agreements, name changes, and corrective changes, a host of other events can 
be registered using this process.  The aggregate data are stored in the PTO’s 
assignment database.186  In this analysis, I focused on recorded patent assign-
ments and security agreements.187  I identified these events by using the 
 
180. Each patent class is associated with an “art unit,” and each of these, in turn, is associated 
with one of nine technology centers.  See Patent Classification: Classes Arranged by Art Unit, U.S. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/classification/art/index.jsp (last 
modified Oct. 3, 2011) (listing art units); Patent Technology Centers, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/about/contacts/phone_directory/pat_tech/ (last modified Feb. 17, 2010) 
(listing technology centers). 
181. I aggregated the patents, based primarily on technology center, into five general 
technology areas: BioChemAg, Mechanical, Semiconductors, Tech, and Other. 
182. The USPTO’s classification scheme has been described as not reflective of actual industry 
differences.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 16–17 (“The PTO provides public access 
to paper and electronic files of patents, but organizes them under a system that differs from 
industry-based classifications.”).  At present, however, there is no alternative scheme in place. 
183. GAZELLE TECHNOLOGIES, http://www.gazelletech.com/.  Although the underlying data is 
also publicly available, I used this database for its format. 
184. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FORM PTO-1595 (2011), available at http://
www.uspto.gov/web/forms/pto1595.pdf. 
185. Id. 
186. See USPTO Bulk Downloads: Patent Assignment Text, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
googlebooks/uspto-patents-assignments.html (providing access to the PTO’s patent-assignment 
records). 
187. I did not rely on the assignments database to identify licensed patents because most 
licenses are not registered with the PTO. 
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PTO’s pre-designated categories and by searching key terms I developed 
through the review of 1,000 assignment records. 
The analysis reported here does not include unrecorded conveyances.  
There is no consensus regarding whether the number of unrecorded convey-
ances is significant.  Several prior studies have asserted that the number of 
unrecorded assignments is likely small.188  This is because recording patent 
assignments puts third parties who might otherwise claim ownership on 
notice and confers legitimacy to patent plaintiffs.189  A scholar who per-
formed an anecdotal analysis of gaps in chains of patent ownership found 
few gaps.190  Others, however, assert that the number of unrecorded assign-
ments is significant,191 particularly among small companies who tend to lack 
formal legal processes and procedures.  In a test analysis, I found that of 100 
patents that listed a non-inventor assignee on the front page of the patent, an 
assignment to that “front-page” assignee was not recorded with respect to 
thirty of them.192  However, this figure may overstate the level of overall 
nonrecording, as a company may feel less need to record an assignment when 
their ownership is stated clearly on the front page of the patent.  Additional 
investigation of this issue may be warranted. 
In addition, it is unknown how many collateralizations of patents are 
never recorded.  As described above, the prudent practice is to record collat-
eralizations in both the PTO and the secretary of state’s office.193  However, 
because patents tend to be identified by reference to general intangibles on 
UCC financing statements, rather than by reference to the individual patents, 
it is difficult to estimate the number of security interests unrecorded at the 
PTO.194 
 
188. See, e.g., CHESBROUGH, supra note 51, at 71 (“In spite of the limitations of reassignment 
data, we believe that the vast majority of patent asset transfers are reported . . . .”). 
189. See Fischer & Henkel, supra note 119, at 10 (explaining that registering a patent 
acquisition legitimizes the patent owner and prevents “good faith” defenses by third parties). 
190. See CHESBROUGH, supra note 51, at 70–71 (finding that for a random group of PTO 
patents, most significant intellectual property market transactions were regularly registered and 
most reassignment histories did not possess gaps). 
191. See Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs, supra note 112, at 1274 (“USPTO 
records on patents reassigned to different entities after grant are notoriously incomplete.”). 
192. Analysis on file with the author. 
193. See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.  However, my correspondence with bank 
and corporate counsel has revealed that dual-filing is not uniformly done at all banks.  Compare E-
mail from Partner, Fenwick & West LLP, to author (Aug. 3, 2011, 9:13 AM) (stating that dual-
filing is the standard practice); with E-mail from In-house Counsel, SVB Financial Group, to author 
(July 27, 2011, 4:59 PM) (declaring that SVB’s typical practice is to not file with the PTO). 
194. See supra note 167 and accompanying text; see also Lissa Lamkin Broome, Supergeneric 
Collateral Descriptions in Financing Statements and Notice Filing, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 435, 452 
(2010–2011) (noting that under former Article 9, all that was required in financing statements was 
the “listing [of] a generic collateral type, even when the security agreement only extended to a 
specific subset of that collateral type”). 
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2. Maintenance, Entity, and Reexamination Data.—The PTO’s 
maintenance-fee-event database195 contains details about payments made to 
keep a patent active.  The database records the number of fees paid, as well 
as whether the fees are paid at the normal or the small-entity rate.196  “Small 
entities” are defined by the PTO as individual inventors, nonprofits, and 
business entities with fewer than 500 employees, and they are entitled to pay 
about half of the fees that normal entities pay.197  I extracted information 
about the number of maintenance payments made as well as the size of the 
owner, based on the PTO’s definition, of each patent.  I used this information 
to create a new variable reflecting whether or not the entity status of a patent 
owner had changed from small to large, large to small, or both.  Finally, I 
used information from LexisNexis regarding whether a reexamination cer-
tificate had been issued198 to identify patents in which ex parte reexamination 
proceedings had been completed.199 
3. Data Available at the PTO Website.—In contrast to intrinsic 
information about each patent, the extrinsic information described above is 
not readily ascertainable from the PTO website.  To determine whether a 
patent is in force requires an examination of the history of fees paid in the 
patent and an analysis of how the fees match up with the schedule of pay-
ments owed.200  Patent reexamination data can be found on the PTO website, 
 
195. See USPTO Bulk Downloads: Patent Maintenance Fees, GOOGLE, http://
www.google.com/googlebooks/uspto-patents-maintenance-fees.html (providing access to the PTO’s 
database of patent-grant maintenance-fee events). 
196. Id. 
197. See supra note 141 and accompanying text; see also 13 C.F.R. § 121.802 (2011) 
(describing an entity eligible for reduced patent fees as one in which the number of employees, 
including affiliates, does not exceed 500 persons); 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a)–(b) (2011) (defining small 
entities as individual inventors, nonprofit organizations of specified types, and business entities 
under a specified size, and stating that small entities are entitled to pay reduced fees). 
198. These data are in the REEXAM-LITIGATE segment of the LexisNexis patents database 
and are generated based on the Official Gazette notices that the PTO publishes when reexamination 
of the patent has been completed.  See 37 C.F.R. § 1.570(f) (2011) (prescribing publication in the 
Official Gazette of the notice of issuance of each ex parte reexamination certificate). 
199. Publication of the certificate means that reexamination proceedings have been concluded, 
with the claims either affirmed, changed, or canceled—even if due to the patentee’s 
nonresponsiveness to the reexamination proceedings.  See id. § 1.550(d) (“If the patent owner fails 
to file a timely and appropriate response to any Office action or any written statement of an 
interview required under § 1.560(b), the prosecution in the ex parte reexamination proceeding will 
be a terminated prosecution, and the Director will proceed to issue and publish a certificate 
concluding the reexamination proceeding under § 1.570 in accordance with the last action of the 
Office.”).  Inter partes reexamination procedures were not available for the studied patents due to 
their age.  See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
200. Whether a particular patent is in force can be determined by using the PTO’s Public Patent 
Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) online portal.  Patent Application Information Retrieval, 
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair.  It requires accessing the 
“Fees” tab of a designated patent, id., as the application number and the PTO’s maintenance fee 
schedule must also be known.  If the patent term has been extended, it is even more difficult to 
know without reviewing the “file history” the patent how long the patent will be in force.  Id. 
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but only in a patent-by-patent,201 cumbersome way.202  Determining the cur-
rent owner of a patent—if any transfers have been recorded—also takes some 
work, though it is relatively straightforward.203  However, due to the multiple 
ways a company can be referred to,204 and the “games” companies play in 
order to hide their patent holding, determining what patents a company owns 
is a difficult task.205  Because there is no requirement to record patent 
transfers, it is impossible to identify with absolute certainty a company’s 
complete patent holdings—or who owns a patent—from the public record. 
B. Coding Litigations 
In order to detect the patents most likely to be litigated, I focused my 
analysis on the differences between litigated and unlitigated patents.  
However, I also considered the differences among litigated patents.  
Different parties litigate their patents for different reasons;206 it may also be 
the case that the patents they litigate also differ from each other in measur-
able ways.  If this is the case, a more segmented approach may provide more 
precise results.  Such results might also help inventors, particularly 
companies, focus on threats posed by individual inventor patents separately 
from competitor patents against which the company may enjoy greater 
protection. 
To test the differences between litigated patents, I coded each litigated 
patent according to who litigated it.207  Scholars have used a variety of 
methods to classify patentees and patent plaintiffs; there is no single 
 
201. E-mail from PTO official to author (Mar. 21, 2011, 8:53 AM) (indicating that the agency 
does not have “plans for creating a consolidated listing of patents for which reexams have been 
requested”). 
202. E-mail from PTO official to author (Apr. 12, 2011, 12:05 PM) (noting the difficulty 
inherent in figuring out whether a patent reexamination was performed ex parte or inter partes: 
“[T]he relevant data likely exist within the Patent Application Location and Monitoring (PALM) 
records but are unavailable via the PAIR website. . . .  [To access them,] you might have to file a 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.”). 
203. The easiest way is to go to the PTO assignments database and search for the patent.  
Change Ownership, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/
changeownership.jsp.  However, as described above, patentees who have not recorded their 
assignments cannot be determined solely from the record, even through this process.  See supra 
section III(A)(1). 
204. See Hall et al., supra note 83, 425 n.22 (“[T]he same firm may appear in different patent 
documents under various, slightly different names, one assignee may be a subsidiary of the other, 
etc.”). 
205. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 130 (“Testimony suggested that parties often 
fail to report assignments to the PTO or list ‘shell companies’ as assignees, ‘making it as difficult as 
possible, apparently, to trace back to the true assignee of the patent.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
206. See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in 
the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1577–90 (2009) [hereinafter Chien, Of 
Trolls] (discussing the different types of patent disputes and what motivates them). 
207. There were a handful of patents that were litigated by different entities over their lives.  In 
most cases, the entity type was consistent; however, in the few that were not, I relied upon the first 
litigating entity. 
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approach.208  Because one of my objectives was to test the differences among 
litigated patents, I placed patents into one of three major categories: litigated 
by a practicing entity, litigated by an individual, and litigated by a PAE.209  
The choice of these categories yielded enough data in each individual cate-
gory to enable reliable statistical analyses to be performed.  The majority of 
litigated patents, about 73%, were asserted by practicing-company plaintiffs, 
18% were asserted by individuals, and 9% were asserted by PAEs.210 
C. Analyses Performed 
I applied standard statistical techniques to address each of three 
questions: first, how do litigated patents differ from unlitigated patents with 
respect to the patents’ acquired traits; second, do the differences between 
litigated and unlitigated patents enable higher risk patents to be identified 
before they are actually litigated; and third, what are the differences between 
patents that are litigated by different kinds of plaintiffs? 
First, I generated descriptive statistics to describe the acquired 
characteristics of patents developed over their lifetimes.211  I compared 
litigated and unlitigated patents along these dimensions; the results are re-
ported in Figure 2.  I used standard statistical approaches to see whether the 
differences I observed were the result of chance or represented statistically 
significant differences.  I used bivariate techniques to test whether or not a 
particular characteristic of a patent, in isolation, was correlated with the liti-
gation of that patent,212 and I performed logistic regression analyses to take 
 
208. See, e.g., Chien, Of Trolls, supra note 206, at 1599 tbl.2 (categorizing cases by such 
factors as the size of the companies involved and whether those companies were publicly or 
privately owned); Ball & Kesan, supra note 60, at 31 tbl.2, 32 tbl.3 (dividing patent litigants into a 
number of classes, including “small firm,” “medium firm,” “large firm,” and “licensing firm”). 
209. I performed my analysis on the first named plaintiff in each patent infringement suit and 
the first named defendant in each declaratory judgment suit.  I determined the posture of the suit by 
reading the complaints in DocketX and PACER.  I placed each litigated patent into one of three 
categories as follows: First, I classified the patent as litigated by a PAE either (i) if it was asserted 
by a company that had no Internet presence other than in association with litigation or the asserted 
patent, or (ii) if it was asserted by a company or subsidiary focused on the litigation or licensing of 
patents.  Second, if the patent was litigated by an individual suing in his or her own name, I 
classified it as an individual-entity-litigated patent.  Finally, companies that, based on their 
descriptions, made or sold goods or services were classified as practicing companies.  I assumed 
that foreign entities, which comprised a small percentage of the sample, were practicing entities.  In 
my sample, there were a handful of patents that were asserted by more than one entity over its 
lifetime; however, the asserters all belonged to the same category.  I excluded from the analysis a 
single patent that did not fit into any of these categories because it was litigated by a university. 
210. In a sample of high-tech patent litigations taken from a later period, 2000–2008, 5% were 
initiated by individuals, 17% by PAEs, 1% by nonprofits, and the remainder by practicing 
companies.  Chien, Of Trolls, supra note 206, at 1600 tbl.3.  The difference in nonpracticing-entity 
share is likely attributable to the growth in the troll phenomenon described earlier. 
211. My dataset included 2,636 litigated and unlitigated patents. 
212. I treated whether or not a patent was litigated as the dependent variable and the 
characteristics of each patent as the independent variables.  For my bivariate comparisons, I 
performed two types of tests: t-test for continuous independent variables, and chi-squared test for 
independent binary variables.  Because several of the continuous-variable values were distributed 
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into account the interaction between variables.213  In my regression models, 
as illustrated in Table 1, I included the intrinsic and acquired traits of patents, 
both separately and together. 
 
Table 1.  Patent Traits Studied214 
Intrinsic Traits 
Claims The number of claims in the patent 
Issued to Small-
Entity OwnerŦ 
Whether the issue fee was paid by a small entity 
Foreign 
Counterparts 
The number of foreign-counterpart patents 
Family 
Members 
The number of patents, including “parent” and “child” patents 
(continuation, continuation-in-part, and divisional patents) in 
the patent’s family 
Acquired Traits 
Recorded 
Assignments 
The number of recorded reassignments in the patent 
Recorded 
TransferŦ 
Whether the patent was reassigned, excluding merger and 
acquisition and intracompany or organization reassignments 
Owner Size 
ChangeŦ 
Change in owner size from small entity to large entity or vice 
versa 
Maintenance 
Fees 
Number of maintenance fees paid 
Ex Parte 
ReexaminedŦ 
Ex parte reexamination certificate issued 
CollateralizedŦ Security interest in the patent recorded 
Adjusted 
Forward Cites 
The number of cites to a patent made by subsequent patents 
without common investorship in the patent 
Ŧ Binary variable 
 
Logistic regression analysis is appropriate for determining the 
relationship between a yes-or-no outcome (such as whether or not a patent is 
litigated) and a set of diverse factors that may be expressed in numerical 
(continuous), binary (dichotomous), or categorical terms.215  Throughout the 
 
substantially non-normally, I transformed them using a log transformation before subjecting them to 
statistical analysis.  I used Microsoft Excel to perform the bivariate comparisons.  For an overview 
and description of statistical approaches for testing for significance, see HARRY FRANK & 
STEVEN C. ALTHOEN, STATISTICS: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 363–68 (1994). 
213. I included both intrinsic and acquired variables in the regression.  See infra Appendix A.  I 
used the open-source statistics program R and the proprietary program SPSS to perform the logistic 
regressions. 
214. Over the lifetime of each patent as well as prior to the time of first litigation.  See infra 
Figure 2 (showing the differences between litigated and unlitigated patents developed over their 
lifetimes); Figure 3 (showing these differences as developed prior to the time of litigation). 
215. For further information on logistical regression analysis, see generally SCOTT MENARD, 
APPLIED LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS (1995). 
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Article, I report the full results of the analyses I performed.216  In regression, 
relationships between independent variables can impact model results, exag-
gerating or suppressing the significance of certain variables.  This problem is 
known as multicollinearity.217  I performed multicollinearity-diagnostic tests 
to ensure that my results were not distorted.218 
To test the predictive relevance of the characteristics studied, I 
constructed a time-series model.  This model, depicted in Figure 3, explored 
the extent to which the difference between litigated and unlitigated patents 
developed before, rather than after, the litigation.219  In contrast to my 
descriptive model, which tracked differences between litigated and 
unlitigated patents developed over the lifetime of a patent, my time-series 
model included a snapshot of each litigated patent and its matched 
counterparts prior to the time of the litigated patent’s first litigation.  To 
enable a comparison across patents despite having patents of different ages in 
the sample, I adjusted the number of forward citations and assignments by 
time.220  To determine the relative importance of each set of characteristics, I 
considered three models: one based on the intrinsic characteristics of the 
patents, one based on the acquired characteristics of the patents, and one 
based on the patent’s intrinsic and acquired characteristics.  The results of 
this analysis are shown in Figure 4.  Finally, I analyzed the differences be-
tween litigated patents based on who litigated them.  The results of this 
analysis are reported in Figure 5. 
IV. Results and Discussion 
A. The Acquired Traits of Litigated Patents—Descriptive Results 
Patents destined for litigation start out with certain traits that set them 
apart from the vast majority221 of patents that do not end up in litigation.  In 
this study, I asked whether additional differences between litigated and 
unlitigated patents developed after the patent issued.  This subpart, and in 
particular Figure 2, reports the descriptive results of my comparison of liti-
gated and unlitigated patents based on the characteristics they developed over 
their lifetimes.  While my focus was on studying the relationship between the 
acquired traits of the patents and litigation, my regression models included 
both intrinsic and acquired traits. 
 
216. See infra Appendix A (reporting coefficients, standard errors, and significance at the .05, 
.01, and .001 levels). 
217. MENARD, supra note 215, at 65 (defining multicollinearity as “a problem that arises when 
independent variables are correlated with one another”). 
218. While Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values exceeding 10 (or 2.5) are generally seen as 
cause for concern, among the studied variables the VIF values were all below 1.5. 
219. I constructed the time-series model using the variables listed in Table 1. 
220. Because all of the patents in this study issued in the same year, I did not need to control for 
variances in the overall number of patents issued per year. 
221. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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The results are dramatic—in every way I considered, litigated patents 
differed significantly post-issue from unlitigated patents.  Litigated patents 
are more likely to be transferred and nearly four times as likely as unlitigated 
patents to experience a change in owner size.  They are a hundredfold more 
likely to experience ex parte reexamination than are unlitigated patents.222  
They are maintained more times, on average, than are unlitigated patents.  
They are more often collateralized and are cited twice as many times. 
 
Figure 2.  Descriptive Statistics—The Acquired Characteristics of 
Litigated and Unlitigated Patents over their Lifetimes 
 
 
Each of the observed differences in acquired characteristics between 
litigated and unlitigated patents was statistically significant.223  These traits 
had an impact on the likelihood of litigation when considered in isolation as 
well as when considered together with all of the intrinsic and acquired 
 
222. Inter partes reexamination was not available for any of the patents in this sample.  See 
supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
223. These differences were statistically significant based on both bivariate and regression 
methods.  For the bivariate tests I performed in each category (one-tailed t-test for the continuous 
variables and chi-squared test for the binary variables), all the observed differences were significant 
to at least the .01 level.  The regression results based on patent characteristics can be found in 
Appendix A, infra. 
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traits.224  The differences were also robust, holding up in virtually every cate-
gory across all of the technology categories I studied.225 
These results amplify and deepen our understanding of litigated patents.  
Previous studies have shown that patent owners give patents destined for liti-
gation more time and attention during prosecution.226  My results show that 
this differential treatment continues even after patents leave the PTO.  These 
findings—that the patents worth investing in and citing to are also the patents 
worth fighting about—are not necessarily surprising.  However, they do 
identify additional clues that can be used to predict what patents may end up 
in litigation.  Broadly defined, these types of traits fall into two categories: 
traits that reflect the value of the patent and traits that reflect ownership of 
the patent. 
For example, patent owners pay more maintenance fees on patents 
destined for litigation.227  They are more likely to strengthen and defend 
patents that end up in litigation by pursuing and completing ex parte reex-
amination of them.228  These investments in the patent indicate that the patent 
owner feels that the patent is worth preserving and potentially strengthening.  
Litigated patents are also more frequently cited by subsequent patents, a 
measure of their economic value.229 
Other events in a patent’s life arguably have as much to do with its 
owner as they do with the patent itself.  Litigated patents were nearly twice 
as likely to have been used as collateral as were unlitigated patents.  A 
company’s decision to use a patent as collateral says something about the 
company—that it is in financial need and willing to put its patent assets at 
risk.  If a portion of a company’s patent portfolio, rather than the entire 
portfolio, is used as collateral, it may also say something about the 
collateralized patents—that they are regarded as more valuable than others in 
the company’s portfolio or, potentially, that they are anticipated to be the 
subject of litigation.230 
Litigated patents are also more likely to be transferred than unlitigated 
patents.  However, the observed difference in transfer rates was slight (15% 
versus 13%, respectively), likely for a number of reasons.  Patents may be 
 
224. The intrinsic variables I included in the regression were the log-transformed number of 
claims, the log-transformed number of prior art citations, whether or not the initial owner of the 
patent was an individual or small entity, and the log-transformed number of jurisdictions in which 
the patent’s protection was sought. 
225. Except for one out of the fifty industry-characteristic comparisons, litigated mechanical 
patents were transferred at a rate of 14%, as compared to a transfer rate of 15% among unlitigated 
mechanical patents. 
226. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra Figure 2. 
228. See supra Figure 2. 
229. See supra Figure 2. 
230. See CHESBROUGH, supra note 51, at 68–69 (describing the bank practices of taking patents 
as collateral to cover the costs of litigating those same patents and of using patent reassignments to 
secure lines of credit). 
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traded for many reasons besides use of the patent in litigation.  Many, per-
haps most, trades are for the purpose of transferring technology, rather than 
the legal right of exclusion, and they accompany the transfer of a business 
unit, company, or general know-how.231  Patents may also be bought for 
defensive reasons to keep the patents from being asserted or for signaling 
purposes to deter others from suing.232  Even when patents are bought for 
assertion purposes, the buyer’s strategy may be focused on licensing, rather 
than on litigation.233  More cynically, when companies buy patents for the 
purpose of litigating them, they may hide or decline to record these 
transactions.234 
The owners of patents destined for litigation were four times more 
likely to change size—whether the patent changed hands or not235—over the 
lifetime of the patent than owners of patents that were not litigated.236  How 
to interpret this finding is not entirely clear.  The owner’s size change could 
be triggered by its growth, for example, from a small start-up into a midsize 
company.  Or it could represent the transfer of the patent from a PTO-defined 
small entity237 to a large entity, or vice versa.  Of litigated patents that 
experienced a size change, the majority reflected the patent owner going 
“up” in status, from a small to a large entity, rather than the reverse.238  Thus, 
it could be that for the same reason that patents issued to small and individual 
inventors are more likely to be litigated, patents that experience a boost in 
owner size are also more likely to be litigated.  Further analysis is warranted. 
 
231. See supra note 117 and accompanying text; see also CHESBROUGH, supra note 51, at 66–
69 (listing common reasons, unrelated to litigation, why companies reassign patents). 
232. This is the business model of defensive-patent aggregators like RPX.  See supra note 64 
and accompanying text; see also Erick Schonfeld, Is RPX’s “Defensive Patent Aggregation” Simply 
Patent Extortion by Another Name?, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 24, 2008) http://techcrunch.com/2008/
11/24/is-rpxs-defensive-patent-aggregation-simply-patent-extortion-by-another-name/ (describing 
RPX’s model of buying patents and licenses and offering its clients protection from being sued over 
them). 
233. See Myhrvold, supra note 64, at 41, 46, 49 (describing how Intellectual Ventures licenses 
patent bundles to practicing companies and claiming that the company had never sued to defend its 
intellectual property).  But see Nathan Vardi, Intellectual Ventures Launches Its Fourth Lawsuit 
Targeting Dell and HP, FORBES (July 12, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2011
/07/12/intellectual-ventures-launches-its-fourth-lawsuit-targeting-dell-and-hp/ (describing how 
Intellectual Ventures began bringing patent infringement claims in December 2010 after failed 
attempts to negotiate licensing agreements with large, practicing companies such as Hynix 
Semiconductor and Elpida). 
234. See Chien, Arms Race, supra note 15, at 319 (describing the practice of assigning patents 
to shell companies and subsidiaries in order to hide the transactions from others); see also FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 130 (suggesting that parties fail to report assignments or list 
shell companies as assignees in order to make it difficult to determine the identity of the true 
assignee). 
235. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
236. See supra Figure 2. 
237. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
238. One hundred seventy-two patents fit this category; 72% of these had owners that changed 
from small- to large-entity status. 
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B. Predicting Patent Litigation 
Despite these results, the characteristics that distinguish litigated from 
unlitigated patents by the end of their lives do not necessarily predict ex ante 
whether a patent will be litigated.239  The decision to litigate may influence 
the likelihood of a patent developing a certain trait, rather than the other way 
around. 
For example, reexamination in some cases may be prompted by 
litigation rather than predate it.  In addition, when someone buys a patent in 
order to litigate it, the recordation of this purchase may take place after the 
litigation is initiated.  Perhaps the litigation of a patent makes it better known 
and therefore more likely to be cited.240  Endogeneity effects, as they are 
known, can prevent factors that are correlated with an outcome from having 
any predictive value.241  In order to remove the impact of litigation on each 
patent, I developed a time-series model.  Rather than using the traits of 
patents developed over the patent’s life, I used the traits of each litigated 
patent (and its unlitigated counterparts) developed prior to the litigation of 
the patent. 
 
Figure 3.  Characteristics of Patents Developed Prior to Litigation 
 
 
 
239. As suggested by the well-known maxim, “correlation does not imply causation.” 
240. See Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 91, at 140 (hypothesizing that a publicity effect 
increases the citations of a patent for a few years after its litigation and suggesting it might be due to 
awareness of the patent). 
241. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ECONOMETRICS 297 (2005) (explaining how 
endogenous variables lead to bias and inconsistency unless instrumental variables are used). 
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The results were surprisingly robust: in each dimension, the differences 
between litigated and unlitigated patents were observable prior to the liti-
gated patent’s first litigation.  These differences were statistically significant 
in nearly every category.242 
In addition, consideration of the acquired characteristics had a 
measurable payoff.  Including them in the analysis resulted in a more precise 
profile of litigated patents than did an analysis based only on the patents’ in-
trinsic characteristics.  I estimated the improvement by comparing the 
predictive accuracy of three time-series models: one that included just the 
intrinsic traits of patents, one that included their acquired traits, and one that 
included both sets of traits, all developed prior to litigation.  Figure 4 pre-
sents this comparison. 
 
Figure 4.  Predicted Versus Actually Litigated Patents (Based on a 
~75% Observation Rate)243 
 
 
To enable comparison across models, I designed an analysis that would 
ensure that each model correctly predicted about 75% of the patents actually 
litigated,244 with a corresponding false negative or “miss” rate of around 
 
242. See infra Appendix A (showing that, with the exception of whether the patent was in 
force—a product of its maintenance fee payments—the differences in characteristics acquired over 
the lifetime of the patents were also observable with respect to characteristics developed prior to the 
patent’s litigation). 
243. Each model calibrated in order to represent a 76.5% observation rate, indicating a false-
negative rate of 23.5% across models.  Cut values for Intrinsic Traits Model = 0.217, Acquired 
Traits Model = 0.324, Intrinsic and Acquired Traits Model = 0.305. 
244. The actual rate was 505 correctly identified out of 650 litigated patents, or 76.5%. 
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25%.  What varied, then, among the models was the number of false posi-
tives each model identified; in other words, the number of patents predicted 
to be litigated but not actually litigated. 
The results varied widely.  The baseline was represented by “no 
model”—as if the patents were selected at random.245  The number of false 
positives was 1,512 patents.  Using a model based on the intrinsic traits of 
patents resulted in an improvement over this baseline, identifying 774 false 
positives.  However, a model based on the acquired traits of patents was 
more precise, generating 528 false positives, or about 250 fewer than the 
false positives generated based on the “intrinsic traits” model.  The model 
that included both intrinsic and acquired characteristics was the most precise, 
generating only 406 false positives. 
These results suggest that litigation-bound patents can be identified 
ahead of time.  The differences between litigated and unlitigated patents, 
therefore, would seem to have not only descriptive but also predictive power.  
In the example presented here, the number of patents predicted to be litigated 
was reduced from 2,017 to 911 patents.  This suggests that a company 
seeking to clear its rights could focus on fewer high-risk patents identified by 
the model and ignore others. 
While I leave for future research the development of more refined 
predictive models, the ability to rank patent-litigation risk, even at a low 
grade of resolution, has a number of potential applications.  For example, 
patent-litigation-risk indices could be developed for particular technological 
fields by predicting the number of patents with certain probabilities of suit in 
that field.  For example, knowing that a particular technological field is 
higher risk because most of the patents are issued to small entities and the 
field has higher than average collateralization and reexamination rates could 
be useful to a company deciding whether to pursue research in it or another 
field.  A litigation-prediction model could also be used to inform decision 
making regarding how to allocate risk-management resources to activities 
like joining a patent pool, defensive-patent buying or patenting, or allocating 
resources for litigation. 
Litigation-risk ranking also presents a way to sort through a large 
number of patents without having to read through every patent in a portfolio 
or technology area.  Risk ranking, in combination with other techniques for 
winnowing down the number of relevant patents (for example, through 
matching a company’s technology area with that of a potential legal 
adversary), could be used to reduce the “impossible” task of clearance to a 
more manageable level.  Outside of litigation contexts, the ranking methods 
described here have other potential applications.  When evaluating a large 
patent portfolio, the criteria described in this Article can provide an intuitive 
 
245. To get 76.5% of the litigated patents using this technique, 2,017 patents (2,636 ? 76.5%) 
needed to be selected, 1,512 of them being false negatives. 
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way to determine the relative strength of individual patents as well as a way 
to determine how multiple patent portfolios stack up against each other.  
Doing so could be relevant in cross-licensing, purchasing, and management 
contexts—for example, when a company is deciding which patents to main-
tain or abandon, which to sell, and which to donate.  Using criteria that are 
objective and transparent can allay doubts about whether selected patents are 
really “representative” of the entire portfolio. 
At the industry level, the rankings assigned to individual patents could 
be used by those interested in minimizing risk in general.  By knowing ex 
ante which patents pose the greatest threats, a nonprofit or other group could 
better prioritize its efforts on removing these threats through defensive-patent 
purchasing, post-grant review, or reexamination, for example.  Insurance 
companies could also use litigation-risk ranking to develop a sense of the 
general level of risk in an industry, which could then be translated into a 
company-specific policy. 
From the starting point presented here, there are a number of directions 
that follow-up research could take to improve the resolution of the ranking 
approach described here that, while promising, do not provide a “commercial 
grade” solution to outstanding patent-clearance problems.246  Perhaps the 
most obvious refinement would be to explicitly take into account industry 
and technology effects.  PAE litigation mostly involves high-tech patents.247  
Pharmaceutical patent litigation is triggered by the listing of the patent in the 
FDA’s Orange Book,248 and pharmaceutical patents are among the most fre-
quently litigated.249  These industry-specific dynamics influence the weights 
that should be allocated to the different characteristics and also potentially 
skew the results presented here.  In addition, a larger dataset may allow for 
the inclusion of more fine-grained differences, relating, for example, to the 
reissuance of a patent, to the various types of reexamination, or to who 
initiated the reexamination.  Other variables, both intrinsic and acquired, 
could also be developed, relating, for example, to the number of words in a 
claim, the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code of the patentee or 
 
246. Reducing, for example, the field of relevant patents in the smartphone space from 250,000 
to 125,000 would be unlikely to significantly reduce the perceived risk to companies posed by the 
patents. 
247. See Chien, Of Trolls, supra note 206, at 1580 (asserting that nonpracticing entities have 
focused on high-tech patents); Product Categorization, PATENTFREEDOM, https://
www.patentfreedom.com/research-pc.html (last modified Jan. 1, 2011) (reporting that by number of 
patents asserted, by number of nonpracticing entities involved, and by number of individual 
litigations, nonpracticing entities are most active in litigating high-tech patents). 
248. See Julie Dohm, Comment, Expanding the Scope of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s Patent 
Carve-Out Exception to the Identical Drug Labeling Requirement: Closing the Patent Litigation 
Loophole, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 151, 154–56 (2007) (describing the requirement of listing a patent in 
the Orange Book as well as the Orange Book’s paragraph IV provision for contesting a patent’s 
validity). 
249. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 23, 33 tbl.2 (reporting data showing that firms 
in the chemical and pharmaceuticals industries have the highest number of expected suits per year). 
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owner,250 the tenure of the patent attorney writing the patent, or the location 
of the transfer of the patent. 
Unlike previous studies that have used litigated patents as a proxy for 
other types of patents, in this study I use previously litigated patents to iden-
tify patents that are at risk of being litigated in the future.  In this way, the 
present work avoids the selection-bias problems that make it difficult to ap-
ply findings about litigated patents to patents in general.  However, litigated 
patents represent a subset of two other groupings of patents with relevance to 
patent risk: potentially infringed patents and potentially asserted patents.  Of 
these two groups, potentially infringed patents are of less concern from a de-
fensive perspective because of the pervasive nonenforcement that others have 
described.251  However, potentially-asserted, yet unlitigated, patents represent 
potentially costly threats to companies, albeit ones that avoid the expense and 
disruption associated with litigation.252 
According to the Priest–Klein hypothesis, parties that litigate their 
disputes to trial rather than settle them will have roughly equal win rates 
when their respective gains or losses are equal;253 however, asymmetric 
stakes in the underlying dispute may upset this balance.  According to studies 
of patent litigation, asymmetries between the costs or stakes of litigation can 
also explain why parties decide to litigate.254  A natural extension of the 
present work would be to match the present data to these theories by focusing 
not only on whether a patent is litigated, but also on what type of party liti-
gates it, for how long, and against whom.  The dynamics of litigation vary 
considerably depending on whether a suit represents, for example, a battle 
between well-resourced competitors (what I and others have called a “sport 
of kings” lawsuit) or an individual inventor seeking remuneration or an in-
junction (more of a “David v. Goliath” matchup).255  A guide published by 
the Federal Judicial Center on patent-case management characterizes 
competitor-versus-competitor disputes over core technology as “[d]ifficult to 
settle absent a counterclaim or other significant risk to the patent owner or 
 
250. For an overview of the SIC system, see Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) System, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/sic.html. 
251. See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text.  However, from an offensive perspective, 
as well as from a social perspective, potentially infringed patents represent potentially duplicated 
efforts and technology-transfer opportunities. 
252. As one extension of this work, it would be useful to attempt to determine whether the 
“false positives” identified in the models had in fact been the subject of assertion attempts or 
licenses.  I thank Mark Lemley for making this point to me. 
253. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 4–5 (1984). 
254. Cf. Chien, Arms Race, supra note 15, at 335–36 (“The results [of my study] suggest that 
asymmetries between practicing companies are being exploited even in large company suits. . . .  
[T]hey provide empirical evidence that large companies are exploiting asymmetries in the patent 
system by targeting companies whose businesses differ, in some cases significantly, from their 
own.”). 
255. See Chien, Of Trolls, supra note 206, 1599 tbl.2 (developing a taxonomy of patent suits 
based on plaintiff and defendant size and the narratives associated with each pairing). 
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strategic opportunity available from business agreement.”256  In contrast, 
licensing-company-versus-start-up suits are described as most likely to be 
settled “very early in the litigation or just after [a critical] event [for the start-
up].”257 
As part of the present analysis, I compared the acquired characteristics 
of patents litigated by different types of patent holders.  Patents litigated by 
individuals came in last in every category that I considered.  On average, 
they were less mobile, less likely to reflect additional investment, and less 
likely to be cited than patents litigated by practicing companies or nonprac-
ticing PAEs.  
 
Figure 5.  Differences Between Litigated Patents (Traits Developed over 
the Patent’s Lifetime)258 
 
 
These differences imply that greater precision in prediction could be 
obtained by focusing, for example, on patents litigated by individuals.  Jay 
Kesan and Gwendolyn Ball have found that when small parties sue large 
defendants, they are more likely than any other type of plaintiff to litigate 
 
256. PETER S. MENELL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL 
GUIDE 2-45 tbl.2.7 (2009). 
257. Id. 
258. The differences in every category were significant at the .001 level.  Averages calculated 
on the basis of 59 PAE-litigated patents, 490 practicing company-litigated patents, and 117 
individual-litigated patents.  I used ANOVA to test for the bivariate significance of the observed 
differences with respect to the continuous variables and chi-squared test to test for the significance 
of the observed differences for the binary variables (individual versus nonindividual). 
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their disputes to a judgment.259  In my previous work, I have found that cases 
brought by individual inventors against large companies, so-called David-
versus-Goliath suits, take longer than any other type of suit to resolve.260 
Different risk-management techniques may be applied to threats posed 
by different types of patentees—for example, cross-licensing in the case of a 
competitor or settlement in the case of a PAE.  Companies may have a good 
awareness of their competitor’s research and patenting activities and use 
clearance to identify the relevant patents of less obvious stakeholders. 
C. Policy Implications 
When the findings of this study are combined with earlier work, they 
result in a more quantitatively precise profile of litigated patents.  They also 
present a more robust story of patent litigation.  Across industries, the likeli-
hood of a patent being litigated depends on at least two things: the patent and 
the patent owner.261  All other things being equal, valuable patents are more 
likely to be litigated.  But the economic value of the patent is only part of the 
story.  Who holds the patent also matters, as does the owner’s propensity to, 
for example, collateralize the patent or transfer it to someone who is willing 
to litigate it.  
 
Figure 6.  The Characteristics of Litigated Patents 
Patent Traits Patent-Owner Traits 
Litigation-bound patents have more: 
 claims 
 backward citations 
 foreign counterparts 
 patent family members 
 adjusted forward citations 
 maintenance fees 
The owners of litigation-bound patents 
are more likely to: 
 be originally small entity 
 be originally domestic 
 transfer their patents 
 change size 
 securitize their patents 
 reexamine their patents 
 
These insights have implications for patent clearance and risk 
management.  The risk associated with an individual patent depends not only 
on the patent itself and its traits, but also on the patent owner and the owner’s 
willingness to litigate the patent, as represented by a host of factors.  A patent 
issued to a large company has a much lower risk of being litigated than 
that same patent when issued to a small entity or individual owner.  When a 
patent is transferred or the size of its owner changes, its risk profile is 
impacted. 
 
259. Ball & Kesan, supra note 60, at 20. 
260. Chien, Of Trolls, supra note 206, at 1605 & tbl.6. 
261. See supra Figure 5. 
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The findings here have implications for patent policy.  The concept of 
“patent notice” is usually conceived of in terms of the metes and bounds of a 
patent’s claims.262  Indeed, the conventional yardstick of patent notice is how 
well the public can tell what is and what is not covered by the patent.263  But 
the risk a patent poses to follow-on innovators is not only determined by the 
patent’s document and claims—as understood in light of the specification—
but also is influenced by who owns the patent and what is done with it. 
These basic facts are not readily ascertainable based on the patent 
record.  Although the only patents that could be asserted are patents that have 
not lapsed, it is impossible to search only among in-force patents at the PTO 
website, and even finding out whether a particular patent is still in force is a 
laborious process.264 
Patentees are not required to record their transfers, nor are they required 
to specify the nature or the purpose of their transfers.265  Even when they do 
register changes in ownership, they are not required to specify the corporate 
entity that owns the asset, making the seemingly simple task of identifying 
the patents of a particular company extremely difficult.266  As the FTC has 
put it, “PTO records provide poor notice regarding current ownership of 
patents.”267  But if patents provide the right to exclude, the public is entitled 
to know who might do the excluding.  Under the current system of 
recordation, accused infringers may have to wait until litigation to identify 
“the real party in interest.”268 
Other potential clues to the use of patents are obscured by loose 
recording rules and outdated technology classifications.  Patentees do not 
have to record loans taken out on their patents at the PTO.269  The lack of 
readily identifiable technological classes makes it more likely that companies 
 
262. See, e.g., Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (“[T]he public is entitled to be apprised of what is and is not protected by a particular 
patent . . . .” (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 371 (1996))); Corning 
Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“A claim in a 
patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent confers on the patentee to 
exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention.”). 
263. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 10, at 46, 147 (arguing that an “ideal patent system 
features rights that are defined as clearly as the fence around a piece of land” and articulating a 
theory of “notice failure” by which the patent system has failed to inform the public of the 
boundaries of patents). 
264. See supra notes 200–03 and accompanying text. 
265. See supra section III(A)(1). 
266. Cf. AVANCEPT LLC, A STUDY OF: THE INTELLECTUAL VENTURES PORTFOLIO IN THE 
UNITED STATES: PATENTS & APPLICATIONS 15 (2d ed. 2010) (stating that Intellectual Ventures has 
over 1,000 known shell companies that it uses to hold its patent portfolio and declaring that “[w]e 
do not believe that we have found all of the shell companies”). 
267. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 130. 
268. FED. R. CIV. P. 17 (“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest.”). 
269. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
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will, despite their best efforts, fail to identify the relevant patents in the first 
place. 
These forms of “commercial patent notice failure”270 have received little 
attention thus far but represent areas of potential improvement.  The quality 
of any analysis based on patent data is crucially dependent on the quality of 
the underlying data.  If ignoring patents is no longer an option, neither is 
paying attention to all of them.  The ability to sift through them can be im-
proved if the patent system facilitates rather than frustrates doing so. 
V. Conclusion 
Patent litigation is a disruptive and costly enterprise.  The inability to 
anticipate patent litigation has made it practically uninsurable and driven 
companies to rapidly accumulate patents in order to ward off suits.  This 
Article has demonstrated that the uncertainty about which patents are going 
to be asserted can be reduced through identification of the riskiest patents 
ahead of time.  It shows that whether a patent is going to be litigated depends 
on the economic value of the patent, the characteristics of the owner of the 
patent, and her propensity to litigate.  It leaves for future exploration the 
development of higher-resolution predictive models.  It also highlights the 
need for greater policy attention to ensuring that the public has notice of who 
owns and what happens to a patent. 
  
 
270. They are the subject of a work in progress tentatively entitled Rethinking Patent Notice. 
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Appendix A.  The Effect of Various Patent Characteristics on the 
Likelihood of Litigation (Multivariate Logistic Regression) 
 Lifetime Model 
(Characteristics Acquired over 
Patent Life) 
Time-Series Model 
(Characteristics Acquired Prior to 
Litigation) 
Variables in 
the 
Equation 
Intrinsic 
Variables 
Only 
Acquired 
Variables 
Only 
Intrinsic 
and 
Acquired 
Variables 
Intrinsic 
Variables 
Acquired 
Variables 
Intrinsic 
and 
Acquired 
Variables 
Nagelkerke 
R Square .209 .330 .400 .209 .376 .459 
Intrinsic 
Variables       
Claims (Log) 1.349*** (.061) — 
1.158* 
(.068) 
1.349*** 
(.061) — 
1.242*** 
(.068) 
Issued to 
Small-Entity 
OwnerŦ 
2.948*** 
(.107) — 
3.204*** 
(.123) 
2.948*** 
(.107) — 
3.136*** 
(.122) 
Foreign 
Counterparts 
(Log) 
1.100 
(.059) — 
1.018* 
(.065) 
1.100 
(.059) — 
1.043 
(.066) 
Family 
Members 
(Log) 
4.383*** 
(.106) — 
2.479*** 
(.119) 
4.383*** 
(.106) — 
2.972*** 
(.120) 
Acquired 
Variables —   —   
Recorded 
Assignments 
(Log) 
— .283*** (.140) 
.404*** 
(.147) — 
.197*** 
(.142) 
.303*** 
(.146) 
Recorded 
TransferŦ — 
2.052 
(.197) 
1.624* 
(.208) — 
2.406*** 
(.224) 
1.969** 
(.235) 
Owner Size 
ChangeŦ — 
2.843*** 
(.145) 
1.792*** 
(.159) — 
2.247*** 
(.192) 
1.452* 
(.200) 
Ex Parte 
ReexaminedŦ — 
79.000*** 
(.747) 
46.575*** 
(.761) — 
63.669*** 
(1.039) 
35.501*** 
(1.058) 
Maintenance 
Fees&/In 
Force Prior 
to First 
LitigationŦ 
— 1.991*** (.059) 
2.162*** 
(.064) — 
7.8E+08 
(1507.8) 
7.6E+08 
(1465) 
Adjusted 
Forward 
Cites (Log) 
— 1.520*** (.050) 
1.417*** 
(.053) — 
1.418*** 
(.046) 
1.46*** 
(.050) 
SecuritizedŦ — 1.71*** (.171) 
1.443* 
(.179) — 
2.502*** 
(.190) 
2.092*** 
(.202) 
N = 2.636.  Displayed: Exp(B) (Standard Error) 
Ŧ  Binary variable 
&  Categorical variable (Variables not otherwise designated are continuous variables.) 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
**  Significant at the .01 level 
*  Significant at the .05 level 
Note: Logit coefficients obtained using Robust Standard Errors.  Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
